LEGISLATIVE CLAIM BILL
MANUAL

POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND
INFORMATION CONCERNING
INTRODUCTION AND PASSAGE

THE FLORIDA SENATE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Revised 2014
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INTRODUCTION

The claim bill process is unique and often thought to be complex and confusing. This manual is designed to assist in navigating through the claim process.

House and Senate staff are available to answer questions about the claim bill process. House staff of the Judiciary Committee can be reached at (850) 717-4850; Senate General Counsel staff can be reached at (850) 487-5237.

Suggested Procedures for Legislators

✓ Advise the claimant or attorney of the sequence of events in the filing of a claim bill.

✓ All Senate claim bills, whether companions or those filed only in the Senate, must be filed by August 1 in order to be considered by the Senate in the following regular session, except that members elected to the Senate during a general election may have sixty-two (62) days from the date of that election to file a claim bill(s).

✓ A House claim bill that does not have a Senate companion bill timely filed in the Senate will not be considered by the Senate.

✓ Make sure that the claim is ready to be heard by the Special Master when the Special Master schedules the hearing.

✓ Check with the staff of either chamber to determine whether the claim has been filed in a prior year, and if so, obtain a copy of any available previous reports.

✓ Ask the claimant or attorney to provide you with an information packet containing the major documentation and a summary of the highlights of the claim. Submit the information to the bill drafting office for preparation of the claim bill.

✓ Each chamber will have its own Special Master assigned to review and report on specific claim bills; however, to minimize travel and to avoid unnecessary repetition, the Special Masters usually hold joint hearings. You are invited to attend the Special Masters’ hearing, if you care to; however, attendance by the bill’s sponsor is not required.

✓ Follow the bill through the regular committee process once the Special Master’s report is published. Generally, the Special Master will be available to present his or her report to the committees of reference, but each bill’s sponsor should also be present and available to answer questions from committee members.
I. DEFINITIONS AND PROCESS

A. What is a Claim Bill?
A claim bill, sometimes called a relief act, is a bill that compensates a particular individual or entity for injuries or losses occasioned by the negligence or error of a public officer or agency. It is a means by which an injured party may recover damages even though the public officer or agency involved may be immune from suit. Majority approval in both chambers of the Legislature is required for passage.

B. What is Sovereign Immunity?
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that prohibits suits against the government without the government’s consent. The Florida Constitution addresses sovereign immunity in Article X, Section 13. This provision allows the state to waive its immunity through an enactment of general law. Sovereign immunity extends to all subdivisions of the state, including counties, municipalities, local constitutional officers, and school boards.

In 1973, the Florida Legislature enacted section 768.28, Florida Statutes. This section allows individuals to sue the state government, subdivisions of the state, counties, municipalities and political subdivisions under circumstances where a private person “would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of the state. . . .”

C. Is there a Statute of Limitations?
Pursuant to section 11.065, Florida Statutes, no claims against the state shall be presented to the Legislature more than 4 years after the cause for relief accrued. Any claim presented after this time of limitation shall be void and unenforceable. Further, all relief acts of the Legislature shall be for payment in full. No further claims for relief may be submitted to the Legislature for a previously compensated claim.

D. Are there Monetary Limits on Recovery?
Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, imposes a $200,000 limit per person and a $300,000 limit per incident on the collectability of any tort judgment based on the government’s liability.¹ These limits do not preclude plaintiffs from obtaining judgments in excess of the statutory cap; however, plaintiffs cannot force the government to pay damages that exceed the recovery cap. Section 11.066, Florida Statutes, requires a claimant to petition the Legislature, in accordance with its rules, to seek an appropriation to pay a judgment against the state or state agency or subdivision thereof.

E. Must All Alternative Remedies be Exhausted?
House Rule 5.6(c) and Senate Rule 4.81(6) provide that the Legislature will not process a contested claim bill until the claimant has exhausted all available administrative and judicial remedies. However, both bodies may consider a bill in which the parties have executed a

¹ Section 1, ch. 2010-26, Laws Of Florida, amended s. 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 2011, applicable to claims arising on or after that date, to the current levels.
written settlement agreement. Under Senate Rule 4.81(6), this policy does not apply to a bill addressing a claim based on wrongful incarceration.

F. How does the Special Master Process Work?

Once a claim bill is filed, the presiding officer of each house of the Legislature may refer the bill to a Special Master, as well as to one or more committees, for review. The Special Masters of each house conduct a joint hearing to determine liability, proximate cause, and damages. Senate Rule 4.81(3) requires those hearings to be conducted pursuant to reasonable notice, with discovery governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Evidence Code, as applicable. The Special Master will administer an oath to all witnesses, accept relevant documentary and tangible evidence properly offered, record the proceedings, and prepare a final report containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. Special Masters are not bound by jury verdicts or stipulations entered into by the parties; further, once filed, claim bills are subject to the amendatory process of each house as provided by rule. Though not bound by the Senate Rule, House Special Masters generally follow the same process; however, a House Special Master may file a summary report regarding a settled claim. The House must have a settlement agreement signed by all parties before the claim is considered “settled.”

G. General or Local?

A general law is an act intended to have statewide application. For claim bill purposes, if the respondent of the claim is a state agency, which would require an appropriation from the state’s general revenue or from an executive agency’s budget, then the claim is a general bill.

A local or special law is any legislative act that:

1) applies to an area or entity that is less than the total area or population of the state; and

2) contains subject matter that entitles those to whom it is applicable to the publication or referendum required by Article III, Section 10, State Constitution.

Generally, if the respondent is a county, municipality, school board, district, local constitutional officer, or other subdivision of the state, then the claim is a local bill.

Article III, Section 10, State Constitution, prohibits special laws unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by general law.

Sections 11.02, 11.021, and 11.03, Florida Statutes, provide the requirements for publication of the required notice. The notice must contain the name of the claimant, the nature of the injury or loss, and the amount of the claim.

House Rule 5.5(c) requires that all local claim bills be accompanied by an affidavit of proper advertisement, securely attached to the original bill ahead of its first page. Similarly, Senate Rule 3.3 requires that all local bills be accompanied by an affidavit of proper advertisement. Language requirements can be found in section 11.03, Florida Statutes. Furthermore, the Senate requires that all local bills requiring publication have proof of publication securely attached to the original copy of the bill, when introduced, and the words “Proof of Publication Attached” clearly typed or stamped on the Senate side of the bill jacket.
There are two important characteristics that distinguish a local claim bill from a general claim bill: the “relating to” clause in the title of the bill and the appropriation sections that follow the enacting clause.

The “relating to” clause in the title of a local claim bill should always cite the name of the county or the local governmental entity from which compensation is being sought. In other words, the “relating to” clause of a local relief act always indicates that the bill is local in nature, as in the following examples:

- “An act for the relief of James Simpson by Seminole County”;
- “An act for the relief of Danielle Simms and Corey Simms by the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Department”;
- “An act for the relief of Hunter Wright by the West Volusia Hospital District.”

The “relating to” clause for a general claim bill should always name the claimant or claimants seeking relief under the act, as in:

- “An act for the relief of John Smith and Mary Smith.”

H. What are the Filing Deadlines?

Senate Rule 4.81 requires that all claim bills be filed with the Secretary of the Senate on or before August 1 to be considered by the Senate during the next regular session. Newly elected Senators have 62 days from the date of election to file a claim bill. House Rule 5.2 requires that general and local bills be filed with the House Clerk by noon of the first day of the regular session.

I. Is there a Limit on the Number of Bills a Member Can File?

House Rule 5.3 prohibits members from filing more than six bills for a regular session. House Rule 5.3(b)(1) provides that local claim bills do not count toward a member’s six bills. There is no corresponding limit in the Senate. Senate Rule 4.81(2) prohibits consideration of a House claim bill that lacks a Senate companion.

J. Can a Claimant Collect in Excess of the $200,000/$300,000 Limit Without Filing a Claim Bill?

Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, provides that the state or an agency or subdivision thereof may agree, within the limits of insurance coverage provided, to pay a claim made or an excess judgment rendered against it without further action by the Legislature.

K. Are there any Limitations or Restrictions on Fees?

Section 768.28(8), Florida Statutes, provides that no attorney may charge, demand, receive, or collect, for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 percent of any judgment or settlement. The Florida Supreme Court has held that the Legislature has the authority to limit attorneys’ fees in a claim bill, even if an attorney had contracted for a higher amount. Gamble v. Wells, 450 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1984), (refer to section IV. EXAMPLES of this manual).

Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the statutory 25 percent limitation on attorneys’ fees applies to all situations involving waiver of sovereign immunity,
whether it be the underlying $200,000/$300,000, the excess part awarded by the claim bill, or
the result of a settlement and voluntary payment in any amount made by a governmental
respondent or by its insurance carriers. *Ingraham v. Dade County School Board*, 450 So.2d
847 ( Fla. 1984).

Fees contingent upon the outcome of any specific legislative action are generally prohibited
by section 11.047(2), Florida Statutes, except in the case of claim bills. It is considered a
conflict of interest for a legislator to file a claim bill if that member, or the member’s law
partner, would receive a fee for services. Commission on Ethics, *House Opinion 69-009 and
71-016* (refer to section *IV. EXAMPLES* of this manual).
II. CITATIONS: STATE CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE RULES, FLORIDA STATUTES

A. State Constitution
   Article III, Section 10, State Constitution—Special Laws
   Article X, Section 13, State Constitution—Suits against the state

B. Senate Rules
   Senate Rule 3.3—Form of local bills
   Senate Rule 4.81—Claim bills

C. House Rules
   House Rule 5.2—Member Bill Filing Deadline
   House Rule 5.3—Limitation on Member Bills Filed
   House Rule 5.5—Local Bills
   House Rule 5.6—Claim Bills

D. Florida Statutes
   Section 11.02, F.S.—Notice of special or local legislation or certain relief acts.
   Section 11.021, F.S.—Evidence of publication of notice.
   Section 11.03, F.S.—Proof of publication of notice.
   Section 11.047, F.S.—Contingency fees; prohibitions; penalties.
   Section 11.065, F.S.—Claims against state; limitations; notice.
   Section 11.066, F.S.—Suits seeking monetary damages against the state or its agencies; payment of judgments; appropriations required.
   Section 768.28, F.S.—Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations; exclusions; indemnification; risk management programs.
III. DRAFTING A CLAIM BILL

A. Payment of Statutory Limits of Liability
One of the most common omissions in the submission of proposed claim bills is an indication of whether the governmental entity from whom relief is sought has paid the claimant or claimants the requisite amounts due under section 768.28, Florida Statutes, Florida’s sovereign immunity statute, which sets the limits of liability of the state and its political subdivisions. To avoid confusion, a clause stating whether the respondent has already paid the underlying amount should be included at or near the end of the “WHEREAS” clauses, followed by a statement of the remaining amount of the claim.

B. Apportionment of Claim Among Multiple Claimants
Another omission that sometimes occurs in the submission of proposed claim bills is the apportionment of the amount of a claim when there are multiple claimants. The Legislature requires specification of the exact amount each claimant is to receive.

Claim bills with multiple claimants may require a separate appropriation section for each claimant and are usually apportioned in direct proportion to the jury award or settlement amounts.

C. Medicaid Reimbursement Provisions
Where Medicaid reimbursement is owed, use the following language:

Section __. The governmental entity responsible for payment of the warrant shall pay to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration the amount due under section 409.910, Florida Statutes, prior to disbursing any funds to the claimant. The amount due the agency shall be equal to all unreimbursed medical payments paid by Medicaid up to the date upon which this bill becomes a law.

Should this language be the subject of an amendment to a claim bill, an accompanying title provision is needed. “Providing for repayment of Medicaid liens” would be a sufficient title proviso for such a section.

D. Award of Claim to Minors and Incompetents—Establishment of Trust or Guardianship
Essential pieces of information are whether the claimant is currently a ward and whether the claimant was a ward at the time of the incident that gave rise to the cause of action upon which the claim is based. If the claimant is a ward and will be a ward at the time of the prospective passage of the claim bill, it is essential to disclose whether a trust or guardianship account has been established for the ward.
E. **Effective Dates**

Effective dates of claim bills should adhere to the following guidelines:

1.) If the Legislature intends funds for payment of a claim to be appropriated from the current fiscal year’s budget, use an effective date of no later than June 30.

2.) If the Legislature intends funds for payment of a claim to be appropriated from the upcoming fiscal year’s budget, an effective date later than July 15 should be used.

3.) If the bill is a local claim bill, the bill may have an effective date upon becoming a law, an effective date that is a specific date necessitated by the facts, or the effective date may coincide with the beginning of a local government’s fiscal year—October 1.
IV. EXAMPLES

A. Sample Funding Language

**SOURCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEFENDANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(city, county, sheriff, school board, special districts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The (identify the city, county, sheriff, school board, or special district) is authorized and directed to appropriate from funds not otherwise appropriated and to draw a warrant payable to __________ for the total amount of $___________ for injuries and damages sustained due to ________________ on ________________ (claimant).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE AGENCY DEFENDANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Revenue Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is appropriated from the General Revenue Fund to the Department of ____________________ the sum of $______________ for the relief of ____________________ for injuries and damages sustained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in favor of ____________________ in the sum of $______________ upon the funds of the Department of ____________________ in the State Treasury, and the Chief Financial Officer is directed to pay the same out of such funds in the State Treasury.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Fund Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is appropriated from the ____________________ Trust Fund to the Department of ____________________ the sum of $______________ for the relief of ____________________ for injuries and damages sustained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in favor of ____________________ in the sum of $______________ upon the funds of the ____________________ Trust Fund within the Department of ____________________ in the State Treasury, and the Chief Financial Officer is directed to pay the same out of such funds in the State Treasury.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 216 Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Requires Legislative Budget Commission approval for any General Revenue transfer and for any Trust Fund transfer over $1 million.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuant to the provisions of section 216.292, Florida Statutes, the Department of ____________________ shall request transfer of existing spending authority in the amount of $______________ from existing operating categories of the Department of ____________________ to a new category titled “Relief: ____________________” in the State Treasury, and the Chief Financial Officer is directed to pay the same out of such funds in the State Treasury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in favor of ____________________ in the sum of $______________ upon the funds of the ____________________ Trust Fund within the category titled “Relief: ____________________” in the State Treasury, and the Chief Financial Officer is directed to pay the same out of such funds in the State Treasury.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Restrictive Language

RESTRICTIONS ON PAYMENT

DISTRIBUTION TO GUARDIAN*

Payment to the guardian of the claimant, including a reversion to the source of payment upon the death of the claimant. (This language should be used if the claimant is a minor or is incompetent. It is intended to protect payments to claimants who are otherwise unable to protect their own interests).

“… payable to {guardian of claimant} as legal guardian of {claimant}, to be placed in the guardianship account of {claimant}, to compensate him/her for injuries and damages sustained as a result of the negligence of {respondent}. Upon the death of {claimant}, any balance of the $ {amount} remaining in the guardianship account shall revert to the {payor}. It is the intent of the Legislature that no funds exceeding {$ amount} appropriated herein subsequently be spent, or any obligation thereof incurred by the guardian, without prior order of the circuit court.”

STRUCTURED PAYMENT—DIRECT*

Payment through a structured payout. (This language is typically used when the parties have agreed to a settlement requiring payment over a period of years while ensuring compensation to the claimant for a period of years.)

“… upon passage of this bill, the {payor} shall pay {claimant} {$ amount}. One year from the first payment, the {payor} shall pay {claimant} {$ amount}; and one year from the second payment, the {payor} shall pay {claimant} {$ amount}, for a total of {total amount}.”

STRUCTURED PAYMENT—BY ANNUITY*

Payment through an annuity plan purchased by the claimant, including a reversion to the source of payment upon the death of the claimant. (This language is typically used when the claimant has suffered serious or permanent injuries and is likely to require substantial or long-term medical care. It is often used in conjunction with a special needs trust and/or payment to a guardian.)

“… payable to the {guardian of claimant} to be placed in a Special Needs Trust created for the exclusive use and benefit of {claimant}. After payment of statutory attorney’s fees and costs, the balance shall be used to purchase an appropriate structured financial plan, the proceeds of which shall be deposited into a Special Needs Trust created for the exclusive use and benefit of {claimant}. It is the further intent of the Legislature that upon {claimant’s} death, any funds remaining in the Special Needs Trust after payment of any outstanding Medicaid funds shall revert to the {payor}.”

SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST*

Payment to a special needs trust, including a reversion to the source of payment upon the death of the claimant. (This language can be used in conjunction with payment to a guardian, and ensures that the award will adequately compensate the claimant’s future needs over a period of years while protecting the claimant’s eligibility for Medicaid services.)

“… payable to {guardians of claimant}, parents and legal guardians of {claimant}, to be placed in the Special Needs Trust created for the exclusive use and benefit of {claimant}, a minor, to compensate {claimant} for injuries and damages sustained. Upon the death of {claimant}, the Trust balance shall revert to the {payor}.”

*Add Medicaid reimbursement provision from bottom of page 7, if applicable.
An act for the relief of Eric Brody by the Broward County Sheriff’s Office; providing for an appropriation to compensate Eric Brody for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office; providing a limitation on the payment of fees and costs related to the claim against the Broward County Sheriff’s Office; providing legislative intent regarding lien interests held by the state; providing an effective date.

WHEREAS, on March 3, 1998, Eric Brody was driving home in his 1982 AMC Concord eastbound on Oakland Park Boulevard in Sunrise, Florida, and

WHEREAS, that same evening, Broward County Sheriff’s Deputy Christopher Thieman was driving his Broward County Sheriff’s Office cruiser on his way to work, and

WHEREAS, Deputy Thieman struck Eric Brody’s car, leaving Eric profoundly injured, and

WHEREAS, the case was tried to a jury and the court rendered a final judgment of $30,879,670.30, and

WHEREAS, the parties have reached a settlement in the amount of $10,750,000, with other terms of value, and $200,000 has been paid pursuant to the limits of liability set forth in s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, NOW, THEREFORE,

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are

CODING: Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.
Section 2. The insurer of the Sheriff of Broward County has agreed to pay, and is authorized and directed to pay, $10,750,000 on behalf of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office to the Guardianship of Eric Brody to be placed in a special needs trust created for the exclusive use and benefit of Eric Brody as compensation by the Broward County Sheriff’s Office and its insurer, Fairmont Specialty Insurance Company, f/k/a Ranger Insurance Company, for injuries brought about by the facts set forth in the preamble of this act.

Section 3. The amount awarded under this act is intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims, including all attorney fees, lobbying fees, and related costs, arising out of the factual situation described in this act which resulted in the injuries to Eric Brody, and hereby releases the Broward County Sheriff’s Office and Fairmont Specialty Insurance Company, f/k/a Ranger Insurance Company, the Broward County Board of County Commissioners, Broward County, and Christopher Thieman from any further liability. No part of the amount awarded under this act may be used toward the payment of attorney fees, lobbying fees, costs, or other similar expenses incurred on behalf of the Guardianship of Eric Brody in pursuit of this claim or the related underlying litigation.

Section 4. It is the intent of the Legislature that the lien interests relating to the claim of the Guardianship of Eric Brody for the treatment and care of Eric Brody, including Medicaid liens, are hereby waived or extinguished.

Section 5. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
D. House Local Claim Bill

ENROLLED
CS/HB 877, Engrossed 1
2012 Legislature

An act for the relief of Odette Acanda and Alexis Rodriguez by the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital; providing for an appropriation to compensate Odette Acanda and Alexis Rodriguez for the death of their son, Ryan Rodriguez, as a result of the negligence of employees of the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County; providing a limitation on the payment of fees and costs; providing an effective date.

WHEREAS, Ryan Rodriguez, the son of Odette Acanda and Alexis Rodriguez, was born prematurely on February 5, 2005, to Odette Acanda at Jackson Memorial Hospital, and

WHEREAS, after delivery, Ryan Rodriguez was provided with oxygen through respiratory equipment that was contaminated with Pseudomonas bacteria, due to improper infection control measures by employees of the hospital, and

WHEREAS, on February 8, 2005, a positive nasopharyngeal culture revealed that Ryan Rodriguez suffered from a Pseudomonas infection, and

WHEREAS, physicians and other hospital employees failed to review the lab report, failed to recognize the signs and symptoms of the infection, and failed to follow physician orders, and

WHEREAS, an order for antibiotics was not written until February 10, 2005, and antibiotics were not provided until after Ryan Rodriguez went into distress, and
WHEREAS, as a result of the failure of employees to timely identify and treat the infection, Ryan Rodriguez died on February 10, 2005, and

WHEREAS, an autopsy report indicated that Ryan Rodriguez died as a result of the bacterial infection he acquired at the hospital, and

WHEREAS, suit was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the hospital was 100 percent responsible for the death of Ryan Rodriguez, and awarded damages in the amount of $2 million, and

WHEREAS, the defendant appealed the jury verdict, and the final judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor was upheld by the Third District Court of Appeal, and

WHEREAS, the defendant appealed the ruling of the Third District Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the ruling, and

WHEREAS, the parties entered into a settlement agreement wherein they agreed to settle the case for $999,999, of which $200,000 has been paid in accordance with the statutory limits of liability in s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, and $799,999 remains to be paid, NOW, THEREFORE,

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are found and declared to be true.

Section 2. The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County,
d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital, is authorized and directed to appropriate from funds not otherwise encumbered and to draw a warrant in the sum of $793,999, payable to Odette Acanda and Alexis Rodriguez, parents of decedent Ryan Rodriguez, as compensation for the death of Ryan Rodriguez as a result of the negligence of employees of the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County.

Section 3. The amount paid by the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital, pursuant to s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, and the amount awarded under this act are intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims arising out of the factual situation described in the preamble to this act which resulted in the death of Ryan Rodriguez. The total amount paid for attorney’s fees, lobbying fees, costs, and similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed 15 percent of the total amount awarded under section 2 of this act. However, taxable costs, which may not include attorney’s fees and lobbying fees, related to the underlying civil action may be collected in addition to 15 percent of the total amount awarded under section 2 of this act.

Section 4. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
E. Proof of Publication for a Local Claim Bill

NOTICE OF PUBLICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Notice is hereby given of intention to apply to the 2012 Regular Legislative Session or subsequent sessions held in 2012 or after of the State of Florida Legislature for passage of a bill to provide for the relief of the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera for injuries and damages sustained by Juan Carlos Rivera and his survivors, and the death of Juan Carlos Rivera arising out of a negligent security claim which occurred on September 15, 2009 at Coral Gables High School and involving THE SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, in Miami-Dade County, Florida and providing an effective date. The total amount of the claim brought through the claims bill process is $1,175,000.00 (One Million One Hundred and Seventy Five Thousand Dollars) against the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera, for injuries and damages sustained by Juan Carlos Rivera and his survivors, and the death of Juan Carlos Rivera as a result of a negligence security lawsuit against The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, and a compromise settlement, providing a limitation on the payment of fees and costs, providing an effective date.

WHEREAS, on September 15, 2009, Juan Carlos Rivera was a student at Coral Gables Senior High School in the care and custody of The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, and

WHEREAS, on September 15, 2009, Juan Carlos Rivera was attacked, stabbed, and murdered on the grounds of Coral Gables Senior High School by another student, and

WHEREAS, the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera has alleged, through a lawsuit filed April 28, 2010 in Miami-Dade County, Florida, that the negligence of The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida was the proximate cause of the death of Juan Carlos Rivera, and

WHEREAS, Ana Cruz Pena, has suffered extreme mental anguish and suffering as a result of the loss of her son, and

WHEREAS, the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera and The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida have reached a compromise settlement, and said settlement was approved by the School Board on October 17, 2011 in the amount of $1,875,000.00, and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the agreement between the parties, the settlement has been partially satisfied in the amount of $700,000.00.  

WHEREAS, pursuant to the agreement, the claim shall be considered fully satisfied by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida paying an additional $1,175,000.00 to the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera, as authorized by the Florida Legislature through a claim bill, NOW THEREFORE,

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are found and declared to be true.

Section 2. The sum of $1,175,000.00 is appropriated out of funds not otherwise encumbered for payment by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida for the relief of the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera and Ana Cruz Pena, as mother of Juan Carlos Rivera for injuries and damages sustained by and the death of Juan Carlos Rivera arising out of a negligent security claim which occurred on September 15, 2009 at Coral Gables High School and involving THE SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA.

Section 3. A warrant shall be drawn in favor of Ana Cruz Pena as beneficiary of the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera.

Section 4. The amount paid, pursuant to this act, shall be $708,28 Florida Statutes, and the amount awarded under this act are intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims arising out of the factual situation described in this act which resulted in the death of Juan Carlos Rivera, and injuries and damages to the Estate of Juan Carlos Rivera and its survivors. The entire amount paid for attorney’s fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses relating to this claim shall not exceed 25 percent of the total amount awarded under this act.

Section 5. This act shall take effect upon becoming law.
F. Summary House Special Master’s Report for a Settled Claim

Bill #: HB 1039; Relief/James Feurtado/Miami-Dade County
Sponsor: Representative Steube
Companion Bill: SB 42 by Senator Flores
Special Master: Tom Thomas

Basic Information:

Claimants: James D. Feurtado, III
Respondent: Miami-Dade County
Amount Requested: $1,150,000
Type of Claim: Local equitable claim; result of a settlement agreement.
Respondent’s Position: Miami-Dade County agrees that settlement in this matter is appropriate and has agreed to remain neutral and not take any action adverse to the pursuit of a claim bill by Mr. Feurtado.

Collateral Sources: None reported.
Attorney’s/Lobbying Fees: The claimant’s attorney provided an affidavit stating that the attorney’s fees will be capped at 25% of the total claim award in accordance with s. 768.28(8), F.S., and that the lobbyist’s fees, if any, will be included in the 25% fee cap.

Prior Legislative History: House Bill 1013 by Representative Ingram and Senate Bill 324 by Senator Flores were filed during the 2011 Legislative Session. The House Bill passed its only committee of reference (Civil Justice), passed the full House, but died in Messages. The Senate Bill passed its only committee of reference (Rules) but died on the Calendar.

Procedural Summary: Mr. Feurtado filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County for negligence in the 11th Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Miami-Dade County. Prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement by mediation for $1,250,000, of which $100,000 has been paid by the County pursuant to the statutory cap on liability imposed by s. 768.28, F.S., and the remainder is conditioned upon the passage of a claim bill.

Facts of Case: On February 12, 2009, James D. Feurtado, III, while jogging, was hit by a bus owned by Miami-Dade County at approximately 7:00 p.m. at the intersection of Pisano Avenue and University Drive in Coral Gables. The operator of the bus failed to stop at the stop sign before making a right-hand turn and collided into Mr. Feurtado, age 37 at the time. The bus operator was found guilty of violating s. 316.123(2)(a), F.S., for failing to obey the stop sign and was disciplined by Miami-Dade County for violations of safety policies and procedures. Mr. Feurtado, a pharmaceutical sales representative, was in excellent health at the time of the accident.

Mr. Feurtado was transported to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Ryder Trauma Center,
where he was found to have sustained serious injuries to the skull and brain and a right maxillary sinus fracture. He underwent a craniotomy and placement of a drain. He later required further surgery to insert a shunt in order to reduce the brain swelling to a point where a cranioplasty was performed. Although the Claimant’s physicians were able to replace a portion of the Claimant's skull approximately eight months after the accident (the skull was kept frozen), a visible defect is still present. Mr. Feurtado has permanent brain damage, unilateral deafness, vertigo, headaches, psychiatric sequelae, a shunt, scarring, and skull defect, and has sustained serious and permanent neurologic and orthopedic injuries.

While Mr. Feurtado has been able to return to work, he has great difficulty performing his duties and cannot do so as efficiently as he did prior to his brain injury. His ability to remember pertinent information has been impaired, and he often loses his train of thought when speaking with customers. His deafness in one ear makes it nearly impossible for him to successfully interact in social situations with physicians and other customers, which is an essential component of pharmaceutical sales.

The present value of Mr. Feurtado's economic damages from this incident is calculated to be $1,823,468, which consists of his future and past lost earning capacity of $508,083, anticipated future medical expenses of $1,176,840, and past medical expenses of $138,545. If the bill is passed, Miami-Dade Transit operating funds will be used to satisfy the claim.

Recommendation: I respectfully recommend that House Bill 1039 be reported FAVORABLY.

Tom Thomas, Special Master
Date: February 15, 2012

cc: Representative Steube, House Sponsor
Senator Flores, Senate Sponsor
Judge Edward T. Bauer, Senate Special Master
An act for the relief of Stephen Hall; providing an appropriation to compensate Stephen Hall for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of an employee of the Department of Transportation; providing a limitation of the payment of fees and costs; providing an effective date.

WHEREAS, on June 30, 1997, Stephen Hall was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his father, Edward Hall, traveling westbound on State Road 500 in Brevard County, Florida, and WHEREAS, David Eaker, an employee of the Department of Transportation, was stopped on the north shoulder of State Road 500, headed in the same direction as the Hall vehicle, and WHEREAS, as the Hall vehicle approached his vehicle, David Eaker pulled into the path of the Hall vehicle, resulting in a collision between the two vehicles, and WHEREAS, Stephen Hall was injured and was transported by ambulance to Holmes Regional Medical Center in Melbourne, where he was treated for multiple traumatic injuries, including multiple facial fractures and lacerations; multiple intra-oral mucosal lacerations; and orthopedic injuries to his right arm and shoulder, neck, and both knees, and WHEREAS, as a result of the injuries, Stephen Hall was subjected to multiple surgeries and physical therapy, will likely need additional surgery for the injuries in the future, missed 2 years of school, has suffered from mood swings and depression, and has permanent facial disfigurement and continuing problems as a result of the injuries, and
WHEREAS, Stephen Hall’s medical expenses total $51,586.81
to date, and
WHEREAS, David Baker was determined to be at fault and was
charged with failure to yield the right-of-way, and
WHEREAS, the Halls filed suit in the Eighteenth Judicial
Circuit, in and for Brevard County, against the Department of
Transportation in case number 05-2001-CA-006293, and
WHEREAS, the parties mediated the case and reached a
settlement of all claims, and
WHEREAS, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in
which the Department of Transportation admitted liability and
agreed to the entry of a consent judgment in the amount of
$500,000, and
WHEREAS, the Department of Transportation has previously
paid $112,000 to the claimant and agreed to affirmatively
support a claim bill in the amount of $388,000, NOW, THEREFORE,

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are
found and declared to be true.

Section 2. The Executive Office of the Governor is directed
to establish spending authority from unappropriated trust fund
balances in the Department of Transportation in the amount of
$388,000 to a new category titled “Relief: Stephen Hall” as
relief for injuries and damages sustained, which amount includes
attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 3. The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw
a warrant, pursuant to the Stipulated Settlement Agreement
executed by the Department of Transportation and Stephen Hall, in the sum of $388,000, upon funds of the Department of Transportation in the State Treasury, and the Chief Financial Officer is directed to pay the same out of funds in the State Treasury.

Section 4. Any amount awarded under this act pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity permitted under s. 768.28, Florida Statutes, and this award are intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims arising out of the factual situation described in the preamble to this act which resulted in the injury to Stephen Hall. The total amount paid for attorney’s fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed 25 percent of the amount awarded under section 2.

Section 5. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
H. Special Master’s Report on a Contested Claim

SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT

THIS IS A CONTESTED EXCESS JUDGMENT CLAIM FOR $15,575,021.30 OF LOCAL MONEY BASED ON A JURY AWARD AGAINST THE BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE TO COMPENSATE CLAIMANT ERIC BRODY FOR THE PERMANENT INJURIES HE SUFFERED IN A COLLISION WITH A DEPUTY SHERIFF’S CRUISER.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

On the evening of March 3, 1998, in Sunrise, Florida, 18-year-old Eric Brody was on his way home from his part-time job. He was making a left turn from Oakland Park Boulevard into his neighborhood when his AMC Concord was struck near the passenger door by a Sheriff’s Office cruiser driven by Deputy Sheriff Christopher Thieman.

Deputy Thieman was on his way to a mandatory roll call at the Sheriff’s district station in Weston. One estimate of his speed was 70 MPH. Even the lowest credible estimate of his speed was in excess of the 45 MPH speed limit. It is estimated that the cruiser, after braking, struck Eric’s vehicle at about 53 MPH. The impact caused Eric to be violently thrown toward the passenger door, where he struck his head. He suffered broken ribs and a skull fracture. Eric was airlifted to Broward General Hospital where he underwent an
emergency craniotomy to reduce brain swelling. However, he suffered a severe brain injury that left him with permanent disabilities.

Eric was in the hospital intensive care unit for four weeks and then was transferred to a rehabilitation center. He was later transferred to a nursing home. He remained in an induced coma for about six months. After the coma, Eric had to learn to walk and talk again. Eric is now 32 years old and lives with his parents. He has difficulty walking and usually uses a wheelchair or a walker. His balance is diminished and he will often fall. Eric has some paralysis on the left side of his body and has no control of his left hand. He must be helped to do some simple personal tasks. He tires easily. The extent of his cognitive disabilities is not clear. His processing speed and short-term memory are impaired. Eric’s mother believes his judgment has also been affected.

At the time of the collision, Eric had been accepted at two universities and was interested in pursuing a career in radio broadcasting. However, his speech was substantially affected by his injuries and it is now difficult for anyone other than his mother to understand him.

One of the main issues in the trial was whether Eric was comparatively negligent. The Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) contends that Eric was not wearing his seatbelt and that, if he had been wearing his seatbelt, his injuries would have been substantially reduced. Eric has no memory of the accident because of his head injury, but testified at trial that he always wore his seatbelt. The paramedics who arrived at the scene of the crash testified that Eric’s seatbelt was not fastened. However, the seatbelt was spooled out and there was evidence presented that the seatbelt could have become disconnected in the crash.

The jury saw a crash re-enactment that was conducted with similar vehicles, using a belted test dummy. The results of the reenactment supported the proposition that the collision would have caused a belted driver to strike his or her head on the passenger door. The seatbelt shoulder harness has little or no effect in stopping the movement of the upper body in a side impact like the one involved in this case. The head injury that Eric sustained is consistent with injuries sustained
by belted drivers in side impact collisions. Therefore, Eric’s injury is consistent with the claim that he was wearing his seatbelt at the time of the collision. I conclude from the evidence presented that Eric was more likely than not wearing his seat belt.

Deputy Thieman’s account of the incident was conspicuously lacking in detail. Deputy Thieman did not recall how fast he was going before the collision. He could not recall how close he was to Eric’s vehicle when he first saw it. He could not recall whether Eric’s turn signal was on.

A curious aspect of the incident was that Deputy Thieman had been traveling in the left lane of Oakland Park Boulevard, which has three westbound lanes, but collided with Eric’s vehicle in the far right lane. If Deputy Thieman had stayed in the left lane, the collision would not have occurred. At trial, Deputy Thieman testified that he did not turn to the left because that was in the direction of oncoming traffic. However, there was no oncoming traffic at the time and, in any event, Thieman could have avoided the collision by continuing straight ahead. The manner in which Deputy Thieman maneuvered his vehicle was unreasonable under the circumstances and that it was a contributing cause of the collision.

Deputy Thieman was fired by the Broward County Sheriff’s Office in 2006 for misconduct not related to the collision with Eric Brody.

Eric received $10,000 from Personal Injury Protection coverage on his automobile insurance. He receives Social Security disabilities payments of approximately $560 each month. He also received some vocational rehabilitation assistance which paid for a wheelchair ramp and some other modifications at his home.

Eric has a normal life expectancy. One life care plan developed for Eric estimated the cost of his care will be $10,151,619. There was other evidence that his future care would cost $5 to $7 million.

**LITIGATION HISTORY:**

In 2002, a negligence lawsuit was filed in the circuit court for Broward County by Charles and Sharon Brody, as Eric’s parents and guardians, against the BCSO. In December
2005, after a lengthy trial, the jury found that Deputy Thieman was negligent and that his negligence was the sole cause of Eric's damages. The jury awarded damages of $30,609,298. The court entered a cost judgment of $270,372.30. The sum of these two figures is $30,879,670.30. Post-trial motions for new trial and remittitur were denied. The verdict was upheld on appeal.

The BCSO paid the $200,000 sovereign immunity limit under s. 766.28, Florida Statutes. The payment was placed in a trust account and none of it has been disbursed. Attorney's fees and costs have not been deducted. Eric Brody has received nothing to date.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The claim bill hearing was a de novo proceeding to determine, based on the evidence presented to the Special Master, whether the BCSO is liable in negligence for the damages suffered by Eric Brody and, if so, whether the amount of the claim is reasonable.

Deputy Thieman had a duty to operate his vehicle in conformance with the posted speed limit and with reasonable care for the safety of other drivers. His speeding and failure to operate his vehicle with reasonable care caused the collision and the injuries that Eric Brody sustained. The BCSO is liable as Deputy Thieman's employer.

Although Eric Brody was required to yield before turning left, the evidence does not show that a failure to yield was a contributing cause of the collision. Eric reasonably judged that he could safely make the left turn. He was well past the lane in which Deputy Thieman was traveling. The collision appears to have been caused solely by Deputy Thieman's unreasonable actions in speeding and swerving to the right. I believe the jury acted reasonably in assigning no fault to Eric.

At the claim bill hearing, Claimant's counsel urged the Special Master to determine that the liability insurer for the BCSO, Ranger Insurance Company acted in bad faith by failing to timely tender its $3 million coverage in this matter and, therefore, the insurer is liable for the entire judgment against the BCSO. However, because the insurer was not a party to the Senate claim bill proceeding, and because the
bad faith claim is not a proper subject for determination in a claim bill hearing under the rules of the Senate, I did not take evidence nor make a determination regarding the bad faith claim.

Modification of the Claim

SB 42 (2011), which passed the Senate, but not the House of Representatives, required the BCSO to pay the $31 million claim, but stated that, in lieu of payment, the BCSO could assign its bad faith claim against its insurer to the Brodys and, if it assigned its claim, the BCSO was not required to pay the $31 million. The BCSO and the Brodys entered into an agreement in which the BCSO agreed to assign its bad faith claim against its insurer to Brody in exchange for the Brodys' release of liability against the BCSO, but the Brodys have not yet executed the release of liability.

This year, SB 4 reduces the claim amount to about $15.6 million. The bill makes no mention of an option for the BCSO to avoid payment of the $15.6 million by assigning its bad faith claim to the Brodys, but that option appears to be presumed.

Ranger Insurance Company objects to SB 4, claiming that it is "an unconstitutional bad faith litigation authorization bill" masquerading as a claim bill. I do not agree that SB 4 authorizes the bad faith litigation. The authority for the bad faith claim and for the assignment of the claim exists independent of Senate action. There is no legal precedent which assists in analyzing this issue. However, I do not see a constitutional bar to the Senate's passage of a claim bill that orders a respondent to pay a claim that might be (or is even expected to be) resolved by a release of the respondent's liability by the claimant for valuable consideration. If Ranger Insurance Company is right, that the BCSO cannot avoid paying the claim via its agreement with the Brodys, then Eric Brody will be paid by the BCSO as provided by SB 4.

ATTORNEYS FEES:

In compliance with s. 768.28(8), Florida Statutes, the Claimant's attorneys will limit their fees to 25 percent of any amount awarded by the Legislature.
In my report for SB 42 (2011), I urged the Senate to consider the unusual size of the claim bill (about $31 million) and the substantial fiscal burden that would be associated with the Legislature’s regular passage of $10, $20, and $30 million claim bills, especially for claims that will be paid by local governments. I suggested that a balance should be struck between the principle of sovereign immunity and the principle of fair compensation, and recommended that the award be reduced to $15 million. It is still my recommendation that the award should not exceed $15 million, to avoid a precedent for the escalation of claims.

On page 5 of SB 4 is a whereas clause setting forth allegations related to the bad faith claim. Because the bad faith claim was outside the scope of the claim bill hearing and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were made regarding that claim, SB 4 should be amended to delete the whereas clause.

Section 4 of SB 4 directs that half of the State’s lien interests will not be waived and that the Claimant’s guardianship shall reimburse the state for half of the expenses of Medicaid, Medicare, or the Agency for Health Care Administration. The settlement of lien interests can be a complex matter and is normally not addressed in a claim bill. The settlement of lien interests is negotiable, but is subject to the requirements of federal law. The outcome cannot be dictated by a state. SB 4 should be amended to delete Section 4.

For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that Senate Bill 4 (2012) be reported FAVORABLY, as amended.

Respectfully submitted,

Bram D. E. Canter
Senate Special Master

cc: Senator Lizbeth Benacquisto
Debbie Brown, Secretary of the Senate
Counsel of Record

Attachment
I. Text of Ethics Opinion 69-009

Opinion 9

ATTORNEY-LEGISLATOR---FILING OF CLAIM BILL

The question presented to the Committee was whether a legislator would be in conflict with his duties when he filed a claim bill when he or his partner would receive a fee from the claimant.

Chapter 67-469, Florida Statutes, provides in its Declaration of Policy: “…no member of the legislature…shall have any interest financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, or engage in any business or transaction or professional activity… which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties in the public interest…”

Under Rule 5.9—A member of the House of Representatives shall not directly or indirectly receive or appear to receive any compensation for any service rendered or to be rendered by him or others where such activity is in conflict with his duty as a Member of the House of Representatives.

It is the opinion of the Committee that it is a conflict of interest for a member, his law partner or his firm to receive a fee or to participate in sharing any fee derived from claimant cases.

The Committee believes that the test is whether or not the legislator or his law partner or his law firm would receive a fee and that if a fee is to be received by a legislator, his law partner or his law firm it would be improper for the legislator to file a claim bill.

John J. Savage
Chairman

(Journal, House of Representatives, 1969, May 2, page 317)

J. Text of Ethics Opinion 71-016

Opinion 16

ATTORNEY-LEGISLATOR---PARTNER FILING CLAIM BILL

The question presented to the Committee on House Administration and Conduct by a Member of the House of Representatives was whether or not it would constitute a conflict of interest if the law partner of the Member caused to be introduced a claim bill on behalf of a client.

It was the Opinion of the Committee that the introduction of a claim bill by the law partner of a Member, particularly if a fee was involved, would constitute a conflict of interest on the part of the Member. It is well settled that every member of the law firm is the agent of all other members of the firm. The introduction of a claim bill would necessarily require lobbying on behalf of the bill. The Florida Bar Association in two Opinions, 67-5 and 67-5 Supplement, has ruled that a Member of the Legislature would violate Canon 6 if a legislator was a member of a firm active in lobbying in the Legislature even though the legislator did not participate in the lobbying fee, and even though the legislator disqualified himself in voting on the proposal for which the lobbying service was rendered, in this matter, the claim bill.

The Committee on Standards and Conduct of the House of Representatives rendered an Opinion during the 1967 session of the House under Rule 5.9 that it was a conflict of interest for a Member, his law partner, or his law firm, to receive a fee and to participate in sharing any fee derived from claimant cases.
Therefore, in view of the ruling of the Florida Bar Association, and the previous ruling of this Committee, it appears that there would be a conflict on the part of the Member if there was introduced, or caused to be introduced, a claim bill by his law partner.

George Firestone
Chairman

(Journal, House of Representatives, 1971, February 4, Page 119)
K. **Text of Gamble v. Wells, 450 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1984)**

Gamble v. Wells  

Supreme Court of Florida.  
No. 63768.

May 17, 1984.

Cross appeals were taken from a decision of the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Benjamin C. Sidwell, J., which awarded attorney $50,000 for services rendered which led to passage of a 1980 legislative private relief act appropriating $150,000 to his client but limiting his recovery to $10,000. The District Court of Appeal, 436 So.2d 173, declared limitation on the attorney fee unconstitutional, and guardian of child awarded the $150,000 appealed. The Supreme Court, Alderman, C.J., held that attorney fee limitation was a constitutionally permissible exercise of legislative authority and did not constitute an impairment of contractual obligations proscribed by the State Constitution.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Shaw, J., concurred in result only.

*West Headnotes*

[1] Attorney and Client 45 131

45 Attorney and Client  
45IV Compensation  
45k131 k. Statutory Regulations. Most Cited Cases

Constitutional Law 92 2749

92 Constitutional Law  
92XXII Obligation of Contract  
92XXII(C) Contracts with Non-Governmental Entities  
92XXII(C)2 Particular Issues and Applications  
92k2746 Contracts for Services  
92k2749 k. Legal Services. Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 92k146)

Limitation of attorney fees to $10,000, contained in private relief statute awarding $150,000 in damages to child injured while in the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, was a constitutionally permissible exercise of legislative authority and did not constitute an impairment of contractual obligations proscribed by the State Constitution, despite fact that attorney had contracted to take case for a 33 1/3 percent contingency fee. Laws 1980, ch. 80-448, § 1 et seq.; West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10.

[2] States 360 129.1

360 States  
360IV Fiscal Management, Public Debt, and Securities  
360k129 Appropriations  
360k129.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 360k129)

In seeking to obtain relief, for child injured while in the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, by means of a private relief act, the child's attorney was not in a position to demand that the legislature grant compensation to the child, but could only request the legislature to grant the compensation sought; the legislature, as a matter of grace, could allow compensation, decide amount of compensation, and determine the conditions, including a limitation on attorney fee, to be placed on the appropriation. Laws 1980, ch. 80-448, § 1 et seq.; West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10.

[3] States 360 90

360 States  
360III Property, Contracts, and Liabilities  
360k90 k. Capacity of State to Contract in General. Most Cited Cases

Parties cannot enter into a contract to bind the state and the exercise of its sovereign power.

[4] Attorney and Client 45 147

45 Attorney and Client  
45IV Compensation  
45k146 Contingent Fees  
45k147 k. Requisites and Validity of Contract. Most Cited Cases

Legislature had sovereign power to place an attorney fee limitation in statute it enacted to award damages to child injured while in the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and the attorney, by the terms of a contingent fee contract with a guardian of a child, could not deprive the legislature of that power. Laws 1980, ch. 80-448, § 1 et seq.; West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10.

Stevan T. Northcutt of Levine, Freedman, Hirsch & Levinson, Tampa, for appellant/cross-appellee. Howard C. Hadden, Tampa, for appellee/cross-appellant.  
Hamilton D. Upchurch, Chairman, Committee on Judiciary, and Richard A. Hixson, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, for H. Lee Moffitt, Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, amicus curiae.

ALDERMAN, Chief Justice.
Charlotte Gamble, as guardian of the property of Cynthia Gamble, appeals and Ted Wells cross-appeals the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Gamble v. Wells, 436 So.2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The Second District declared invalid the portion of chapter 80-448, Laws of Florida, which placed a $10,000 limitation on the attorney's fee for Cynthia Gamble's attorney. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

[1] We reverse the district court and hold that the attorney's fee limitation in chapter 80-448 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of legislative authority and does not constitute an impairment of contractual obligations proscribed by article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution. FN1

FN1. Gamble, in her brief, also contended that she was entitled to trial by jury as a matter of right. We need not resolve that issue since Gamble's counsel at oral argument advised the Court that, if he prevailed on the first issue and the legislative limitation was upheld, he had no problem with the amount set by the legislature.

The facts are stated at length in the district court's decision. Briefly the pertinent facts are that commencing in 1967, while in the custody of the State Department of Public Welfare, now known as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, due to the negligence of the department, Cynthia Gamble sustained crippling and disfiguring injuries. In 1975, Charlotte Gamble, who had been granted legal custody of Cynthia, contacted Ted Wells, a personal injury trial lawyer, and told him that the child had been abused and injured while in the previous legal custody of HRS. She signed a standard contingent fee contract giving Wells authority to represent Cynthia. This contract provided, among other things, that as compensation for his services Wells would be paid 33 1/3 *852 percent of the proceeds of recovery if the matter was settled without suit, 40 percent if suit was filed, and 50 percent if an appeal was taken from the lower court.

In 1977 Wells decided that the only possible means available for recovery would be a private relief act. He represented Cynthia before the legislature during the deliberations over the claims bill. In 1980, the legislature enacted chapter 80-448, Laws of Florida. FN2 Section 3 of this act specifically limits the attorney's fee to Cynthia's counsel to $10,000.

FN2. An act for the relief of Cynthia Leigh Gamble, a minor; providing an appropriation to compensate her for personal injuries due to the negligence of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; providing an effective date.

WHEREAS, on May 24, 1967, Cynthia Leigh Gamble, then 3 months old, was taken into the custody of the juvenile court of Hillsborough County and because she had no living parent was placed in the custody of the State Department of Public Welfare, and

WHEREAS, on August 6, 1967, Cynthia Gamble was admitted to Tampa General Hospital where it was discovered that she had several injuries, and

WHEREAS, on July 29, 1969, while still in the custody of the department, Cynthia Gamble was readmitted to the hospital suffering from a variety of illnesses and injuries, and

WHEREAS, on August 4, 1969, it was concluded that the child's skeletal deficiencies and changes were the result of vitamin deficiency and trauma, and

WHEREAS, the child was placed in the home of a new foster mother and has since received adequate medical care at the Crippled Children's Clinic to overcome the crippling and disfiguring injuries carelessly and negligently inflicted upon her while she was in the custody of the now Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and

WHEREAS, due to the negligence of the department, Cynthia Gamble has required plastic surgery and orthopedic operations and remains crippled and disfigured, NOW, THEREFORE, Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble of this act are found and declared to be true.

Section 2. The sum of $150,000 is appropriated from funds in the State Treasury to the credit of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, not otherwise appropriated, to compensate Cynthia Leigh Gamble for personal injuries.

Section 3. The Comptroller is directed to draw his warrant in favor of Cynthia Leigh Gamble to be applied to a trust fund to be administered and accounted for by her legal guardian in the sum of $150,000 upon funds in the State Treasury to the credit of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and the State Treasurer is directed to pay the same out of such funds in the State Treasury not otherwise appropriated. The attorney's fee for counsel of Cynthia Leigh Gamble shall be limited to $10,000.

Section 4. This act shall take effect July 1, 1980.

Approved by the Governor July 2, 1980.

Filed in Office Secretary of State July 3, 1980.

Wells advised Gamble that he would not accept only $10,000 and that he believed the fee limitation to be unconstitutional. Gamble refused to pay Wells more than $10,000.

Wells then filed in probate court for attorney's fees, under the terms of the contingent fee contract for costs and for a
charging lien. The probate court awarded Wells attorney's fees of $50,000 pursuant to the contingent fee contract clause which provided for a fee of 33 1/3 percent in the event the case was settled without suit, allowed $710.24 in costs, impressed a charging lien, and denied prejudgment interest. Declining to hold the attorney's fee limitation of the act unconstitutional, the probate court held that this language of chapter 80-448 was mere surplusage.

Upon appeal, the district court held that the attorney's fee limitation amounted to an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation but that this limitation was severable from the remainder of the private relief act. It further determined, however, that Wells waived his contractual rights during his conversation with Representative Upchurch to a qualified extent by holding out for 25 percent of whatever amount the legislature awarded the child. Accordingly, the Second District directed the trial court to reduce the fee award to $37,500, without prejudgment interest.

[2] We disagree and hold that no contract rights were impaired by section 3 of chapter 80-448. By enacting chapter 80-448, the legislature found that a moral obligation existed on its part to redress the physical and emotional injuries of Cynthia Gamble sustained as a result of the negligence of a state agency. This voluntary recognition of its moral obligation by the legislature in this instance was based on its view of justice and fair treatment of one who had suffered at the hands of the state but who was legally remediless to seek damages. Chapter 80-448 is an act of grace to redress a wrong suffered by Cynthia at the hands of the state which is not otherwise legally compensable. In seeking to obtain relief for Cynthia by means of a private relief act, Ted Wells was not in a position to demand that the legislature grant compensation to Cynthia. He could only request that the legislature grant the compensation sought. The legislature then, as a matter of grace, could allow compensation, decide the amount of compensation, and determine the conditions, if any, to be placed on the appropriation.

[3][4] Parties cannot enter into a contract to bind the state in the exercise of its sovereign power. The legislature had the power to place the attorney's fee limitation in chapter 80-448. Wells, by the terms of his contingent fee contract with Gamble, could not deprive the legislature of this power. The legislature was in no way bound to pass legislation conforming with the provisions of the prior contingent fee contract.

Accordingly, we hold that chapter 80-448 is constitutional and reverse the decision of the district court. We remand with directions that the fee award be reduced to $10,000.

It is so ordered.