By Senator Braynon

35-00019-17 201744___ A bill to be entitled

An act for the relief of Brian Pitts; directing the

determine a basis for equitable relief for the purpose

providing an appropriation to compensate Mr. Pitts for

injuries and damages sustained; providing a limitation

court orders and judgments be declared null and void;

directing that the clerk of the court for the Supreme Court and for the sixth judicial circuit remove access

to specified cases; directing the Department of Law

Enforcement to remove access to criminal records

related to Mr. Pitts and to ensure the compliance,

execution, and enforcement of specified provisions;

specifying the limited circumstances under which Mr.

Pitts may represent himself or others in judicial or

administrative proceedings; directing the Department

committed by certain persons; authorizing the

of Law Enforcement to investigate certain illegal acts

Governor, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker

of the House of Representatives to sever portions of

this act under certain circumstances; providing an

on attorney fees and costs; directing that certain

Division of Administrative Hearings to appoint an

of compensating Mr. Pitts for the wrongful acts or

administrative law judge or special master to

omissions of the State of Florida or officials

thereof; requiring a report to the Legislature;

authorizing compensation to Mr. Pitts upon a

determination by an administrative law judge;

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effective date.

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31 32 WHEREAS, this state has clearly recognized the practice of law by lay persons since at least 1980 as declared in $\it The$

35-00019-17 201744

Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980), and in The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer

Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178, 1180
1181, 1183-1184 (Fla. 1997), the Legislature and judiciary having concurrent jurisdiction to regulate such, and

WHEREAS, Brian Pitts has exercised this privilege since 2001 in Pinellas County, and his practice was later enjoined by the Florida Supreme Court in case number SC02-247, in a final order dated November 6, 2003. As stated in the order, "respondent Brian Pitts is enjoined from engaging in the practice of law in the State of Florida as specified in the referee's report. Specifically, respondent is hereby enjoined from engaging in any of the following activities: (1) appearing in any Florida court as a representative of a party, giving legal advice in a Florida case, or otherwise participating in any Florida litigation on behalf of any party unless otherwise authorized by Florida statutes, court rule, case law, administrative rule, or the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar " See The Florida Bar v. Pitts, 861 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC02-247, November 6, 2003),

www.floridasupremecourt.org, and

WHEREAS, since the inception of Mr. Pitts' practice, Mr. Pitts contends that the Second District Court of Appeal, the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida serving Pasco and Pinellas Counties, the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and The Florida Bar have, without cause, continued to deprive Mr. Pitts of the privilege of practicing law as prescribed by the Legislature and Florida Supreme Court, subjecting him to civil and criminal proceedings and penalties

35-00019-17 201744___

on an ongoing basis, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts opines that the Florida Supreme Court, in its 2003 final order in case number SC02-247, has subjected him to entrapment and needlessly and unjustly avoided and failed to exercise its constitutional duty upon his many requests to clarify or amend the final order or to promulgate court rules through The Florida Bar following original proceedings brought or suggested by Mr. Pitts to correct the matter, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida have engaged in a course of misconduct and colluded against Mr. Pitts in cases SC02-247, SC06-1279, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, CTC03-01887MMANO, and CTC03-09855MMANO from 2001 to 2012 and that such misconduct has resulted in his wrongful and unlawful incarceration in the Pinellas County Jail for a total of nearly 1 year, and

WHEREAS, the purpose of this course of misconduct was, in Mr. Pitts' opinion, to retaliate against him for not being a member of The Florida Bar despite being otherwise lawfully authorized to represent certain individuals that he assisted in legitimate legal matters and, by way of his detainment, to thwart his pending pro se actions for relief from the collusion by civil, appellate, or original proceedings directed to or from the above criminal cases, and

WHEREAS, appearing pro se in many of his cases, Mr. Pitts was complimented by several judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit for his exceptional degree of technical and performance competence that would be expected of any trained and experienced

35-00019-17 201744

member of The Florida Bar, yet he was informed by express or implied communication that he would not receive the relief requested in any given proceeding unless represented by a member of The Florida Bar, as a matter of camaraderie, and

WHEREAS, although Mr. Pitts appeared pro se in these cases and other actions seeking relief from such collusion, he was at times represented by appointed counsel; however, such proceedings proved to be futile because, Mr. Pitts contends, the proceedings were staged by the courts and the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida to be illusory, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the courts failed to abide by binding precedent and stare decisis, where applicable, as well as Florida Rules of Court, as evidenced by the series of filings in each case by Mr. Pitts, or his court-appointed counsel, hence depriving Mr. Pitts of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, self-representation, and representation by counsel under the United States Constitution, and

WHEREAS, the Second District Court of Appeal declared in Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) that "appellate judges take an oath to uphold the law and the constitution of this state. The citizens of this state properly expect these judges to protect their rights. When reviewing an appeal with a preserved issue, if we discover that a person has been subjected to a patently illegal sentence to which no objection was lodged in the trial court, neither the constitution nor our own consciences will allow us to remain silent and hope that the prisoner, untrained in the law, will

35-00019-17 201744

somehow discover the error and request its correction. If three appellate judges, like a statue of the 'see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil' monkeys, declined to consider such serious, patent errors, we would jeopardize the public's trust and confidence in the institution of courts of law." Compare Bedford v. State, 633 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1994), and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the judges who presided in his cases have deliberately and intentionally, in concert with the Florida Supreme Court justices, failed to abide by these rules of law as to Mr. Pitts' cases on appeal or by original proceedings brought and maintained by him or his counsel, and

WHEREAS, it has become evident, in Mr. Pitts' opinion, that The Florida Bar, the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and the judges and justices involved at each level of Mr. Pitts' cases all have a personal and private, rather than public, interest at issue in deterring Mr. Pitts from engaging in the authorized practice of law as prescribed in this state, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that such determent is due to a matter of camaraderie among those of the legal profession and an interest in protecting it by any means from lawful competition, where applicable, and

WHEREAS, this determent demonstrates a lack of neutrality, proper motives, and discretion which deprives Mr. Pitts of the required process and means of justice or resolution as normally expected of esteemed persons in their official capacities, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office further participated in the concerted effort of the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney's Office for

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201744

149 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida by illegally incarcerating 150 him in the Pinellas County Jail during the periods of January 151 2003 through April 2004 and March 12, 2010, through July 4, 152 2010, refusing him administrative alternative sentencing without 153 cause, and subjecting him to living conditions and circumstances in violation of Florida Model Jail Standards (2.15)(c); (4.12); 154 155 (4.13); (4.15); (5.08) (a), (c) (1) – (8), and (j); (6.02); 156 (9.06) (b); (9.08); (9.10); (10.01); (11.12); (11.16); 157 (12.03)(d)-(g), (i); (12.06); Appendix A; and ss. 951.03 and 158 951.033(3), Florida Statutes, and 159 WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts also contends that the Pinellas County 160 Sheriff's Office further participated in the concerted effort of the courts, The Florida Bar, and the State Attorney's Office for 161 162 the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida by extending his sentence 163 an additional 50 days of detention in violation of Inmate 164 Handbook XI. A., Florida Model Jail Standard (4.16), and ss. 165 951.21(1) and 921.16(1), Florida Statutes, which subjected him 166 to cruel and unusual punishment, false imprisonment, and a 167 denial of due process and equal protection of the law. See 168 Miller v. Carson, 599 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 169 170 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975); 171 Solomos v. Jenne, 776 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Douthit v. 172 Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), and 173

reflected in a St. Petersburg Times article dated July 5, 2010,

and titled "Thousands of Pinellas jail inmates released without a judge ever setting bail," which is complemented by a series of

WHEREAS, such conditions and circumstances of the jail are

35-00019-17 201744

articles released by the *Orlando Sentinel*, including "Florida's suspect jails: The state's hands-off approach to inspecting jails leaves them vulnerable," dated April 8, 2010; "Jailstandards chief defends system of checks," dated May 15, 2010; "If all Central Florida jails rate an A, is it deserved?" dated May 15, 2010; "Beef up jail oversight: Florida jails need tough oversight, not coddling," dated May 18, 2010; and other articles, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that such conduct was a clear abuse of judicial, executive, and administrative authority as to the state court system and local government, including the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, which resulted in a public embarrassment to this state because such authorities knew that there was not any basis in fact or law for their unlawful acts against him, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that his good name and reputation have been damaged; he has been deprived of due process, the ability to conduct a lawful business, freedom of speech, property, liberty, and equal protection of the law; he has not benefited from constitutional protections against unlawful trusts by public officers and employees under oath of office and double jeopardy protections as to criminal proceedings and sanctions; and he has suffered mental anguish and emotional distress as the result of the intentional misconduct and gross negligence of the courts, the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, The Florida Bar, and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office relating to his practice of law as a nonlawyer in this state, and,

35-00019-17 201744

further, there is no state-action exception to federal antitrust laws, which were violated in the subject cases, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts has suffered, and continues to suffer, significant monetary damage by virtue of lost income, property, and time, expenses, fees, fines, costs, and restitution resulting from the civil and criminal proceedings relating to his alleged unauthorized or unlicensed practice of law, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts frequently appears before the Legislature to instruct, advise, inform, and advocate for or against proposed legislation covering a broad spectrum of topics and subject matter in fact and law with an exceptional degree of technical competence that would be expected of any trained and experienced member of The Florida Bar, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature recognizes that no system of justice is impervious to human error, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature acknowledges that any system of justice may sometimes yield imperfect results that may have tragic consequences, and

WHEREAS, this claim is based on a moral and legal obligation of the Legislature to acknowledge its actions and act on its authority to correct a wrong when those actions have resulted in a manifest injustice or disregard for the law, and

WHEREAS, the filing of this claim bill is in accord with the holdings of the Florida Supreme Court regarding legislative claim bills. See Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit v. Dep't of Natural Res., 339 So. 2d 1113, 1116-1117 (Fla. 1976) ("Absent legislation waiving the state's sovereign immunity . . . this Court cannot authorize relief through the judicial process"); Gerard v. Dep't of Transp., 472 So. 2d 1170, 1172

35-00019-17 201744

(Fla. 1985) ("[W]e agree with the Department of Transportation's assertion that a judgment in this case was not a prerequisite to Gerard's filing a claims bill in the legislature."), and

WHEREAS, the First District Court of Appeal in Jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), stated that although the Legislature has placed limits on recovery, "claimants remain free to seek legislative relief bills, as they did during days of complete sovereign immunity," and

WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in *Dickinson v. Bradley*, 298 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1974), held that "any claim bill is restricted to less than the general public and its purpose is to discharge the state's moral obligation to any individual or other entity whom or which the legislature recognizes as being entitled to such. . . . The legislature may enact a claim bill for what would be a tort if a private party was involved just as effectively as for what would constitute a contractual debt," and

WHEREAS, the Legislature intends that any compensation made pursuant to this act be the sole compensation provided by the state for any and all present and future claims arising out of the facts presented in this act, NOW, THEREFORE,

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are found and declared to be true, and all judicial and administrative remedies were exhausted as of September 9, 2003-April 30, 2004; September 30, 2005; May 21, 2007; September 7,

35-00019-17 201744

2007; December 12, 2008; September 14, 2009; February 22, 2010; March 11-July 4, 2010; and March 30, 2012, respectively.

Section 2. The Division of Administrative Hearings shall appoint an administrative law judge, or a special master shall be appointed, to conduct a hearing to determine a basis for equitable relief for the purpose of compensating Brian Pitts for any wrongful act or omission of the State of Florida, the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office regarding investigations involving Mr. Pitts, the civil and criminal proceedings relating to Mr. Pitts' alleged unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law, and his incarcerations totaling nearly 12 months from 2001 to 2012, if not longer.

master shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the State of Florida, the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, or the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office committed a wrongful act or omission and whether a basis for equitable relief exists, and if it so finds, the administrative law judge or special master shall award Mr. Pitts an amount of up to \$7 million, but not less than \$1 million, to be paid proportionately by the parties that wronged him and to be paid in a lump sum or in payments over a period of no more than 10 years.

(2) The administrative law judge or special master shall report his or her determination to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives by July 1, 2017. The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in satisfaction of the relief awarded by the administrative law

35-00019-17 201744

judge, special master, or Legislature, as provided in this act, and to pay the warrant out of the Administrative Trust Fund or State Courts Revenue Trust Fund within the state courts system and the State Attorneys Revenue Trust Fund to Brian Pitts. Pinellas County shall pay the warrant out of its general revenue fund or by other means it has provided to pay valid claims against it relating to the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office and as to its share of the total award to Mr. Pitts.

- (3) This award is intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims arising out of the factual situation described in this act which resulted in unlawful or unconstitutional acts committed against Mr. Pitts in connection with allegations, judgments, and convictions of the unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law and his incarcerations totaling nearly 12 months, if not longer, from 2001 through 2012. The total amount paid for attorney fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed 25 percent of the amount awarded under this act.
- (4) All final orders, judgments, decrees, and convictions, and orders or liens pertaining to fees, fines, costs, and restitution, rendered in cases SC06-1279, SC09-195 and SC09-2243, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03-01887MMANO in which Mr. Pitts is the respondent or defendant are null and void by this act by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers because the courts failed to recognize the Legislature's lawful and valid enactments, in addition to the courts' own lawful and valid case precedent, rules, and orders, authorizing lay representation as expressed in The Florida Bar

201744

323 v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980); by virtue of 324 inherent authority of this Legislature as expressed in Florida 325 House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 611 (Fla. 326 2008), Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 327 So. 2d 912, 918, 919 (Fla. 1985); by virtue of checks and 328 balances exercised by this Legislature as expressed in State Ex 329 Rel. Young v. Duval County, 79 So. 692, 697 (Fla. 1918), in which the court found, "[a] clear violation of the 330 331 constitutional provisions dividing the powers of government into 332 departments should be checked and remedied." As the court found 333 in State v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 346 (Fla. 1929), "[t]he 334 general rule is that the Legislature is supreme in the 335 legislative field, which is the most powerful branch of 336 government, so long as it does not violate any of the provisions 337 of the organic law. There is to our minds no justifiable 338 exception of any class of legislation from this all-pervasive 339 and fundamental principle." Finally, by virtue of the cases 340 involving Mr. Pitts, the courts failed to comply with the 341 mandates of s. 20.02(1), Florida Statutes, which states that 342 "[t]he judicial branch has the purpose of determining the 343 constitutional propriety of the policies and programs and of 344 adjudicating any conflicts arising from the interpretation or application of the laws." 345 346 (5) The clerk of the court for the Florida Supreme Court, as to cases SC06-1279, SC09-195, and SC09-2243, and the clerk of 347 348 the court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, as to cases CRCAB-349 90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03-350 351 01887MMANO, all pertaining to Mr. Pitts, are hereby directed to

35-00019-17 201744

remove from public and private access all dockets, records, documents, and recorded orders or liens related to those cases and transmit them to the Department of Law Enforcement to fulfill the duties required under section 6 of this act. The Department of Law Enforcement is hereby directed to remove from public and private access all record history and information of a criminal nature concerning Mr. Pitts. This record history and information include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, felon registration, and all other matters concerning the case numbers cited in this subsection. These records, information, or documents may not be used by or accessed for any purpose by anyone unless access to those records is required by federal authorities or for investigations conducted under section 6 of this act.

(6) The Department of Law Enforcement is directed to ensure the compliance, execution, and enforcement of subsections (4) and (5) of this section and section 6, and shall provide protective services to Mr. Pitts ensuring his rights, privileges, and safety under sections 4, 5, and 6 of this act.

Section 4. In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court's final order in case number SC02-247 and the exception contained in clause (1) of that order, unless otherwise authorized by Florida Statutes, court rule, case law, administrative rule, or the rules regulating The Florida Bar, thereby authorizing Mr. Pitts to practice law in this state, the Legislature authorizes Mr. Pitts to practice law in this state under the following designations, titles, rules, decisions, or acts in the capacity as a lay counselor or lay representative:

(1) Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, relating to a qualified

35-00019-17 201744

representative.

- (2) Chapter 44, Florida Statutes, relating to a designated representative.
- (3) Chapter 709, Florida Statutes, relating to an attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney, when coupled with an interest in any personal or property claim, election, right, or interest.
- (4) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to representation in real property management.
- (5) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to a nonlawyer using approved forms.
- (6) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to representation in county or small claims civil proceedings.
- (7) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to third-party standing representation.
- (8) Rule 5-15, Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admission to the Bar.
- (9) Judicial discretion under the inherent authority doctrine.
- (10) Federal law, state law, local rule, statute, local law, or any other court or administrative decision or order under federal, state, or local law and authority.

Section 5. Any appearance or public testimony given by Mr. Pitts on bills or matters before the Legislature, wherever held or convened throughout this state, does not constitute the practice of law. In all circumstances Mr. Pitts retains the right to represent himself at any time he has valid standing supported by law. If Mr. Pitts is the subject of civil,

201744

410 administrative, or criminal proceedings, he retains the right to 411 represent himself without a lawyer in court and in 412 administrative actions or cases. 413 Section 6. Due to the ongoing conduct from 2001 to 2012 414 against Mr. Pitts as described in the preamble of this act, the 415 Legislature directs the Department of Law Enforcement, assisted 416 by Mr. Pitts, to investigate these acts committed by: 417 (1) The Florida Supreme Court justices involved for 418 violations of ss. 914.22(2)(f) or (4)(f), Florida Statutes, and 419 18 U.S.C. 1512, relating to their final ruling rendered on 420 February 22, 2010, in case SC06-1279, which resulted in the incarceration of Mr. Pitts on the eve of the 2010 Legislative 421 422 Session while proceedings on SB 58 were pending, and in Mr. Pitts' cases relating to motions, reviews, and original 423 424 proceedings for violations of ss. 542.21(2), 775.15(12)(b), 425 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 838.015, 838.016, 838.022, 839.13(1), 426 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13, 427 Florida Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 428 242, 1951, and 1962. 429 (2) The Second District Court of Appeal judges assigned to 430 Mr. Pitts' cases on motions, reviews, and original proceedings; 431 the Sixth Judicial Circuit judges; and the state attorneys involved in violations of ss. 542.21(2), 775.15(12)(b), 432 433 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 838.015, 838.016, 838.022, 839.13(1), 434 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13, 435 Florida Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 436 242, 1951, and 1962. 437 (3) The Florida Bar and its representatives, who pursued 438 charges of unlicensed practice of law against Mr. Pitts, for

467

201744

439 their violations of ss. 542.21(2), 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 440 838.015, 838.016, 839.13(1), 895.03, and 918.13, Florida 441 Statutes; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3; and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, 242, 442 1951, and 1962. 443 (4) The Pinellas County Sheriff's Office for violations of 444 ss. 775.15(12)(b), 839.13(1), 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 445 876.10, 950.09, and 951.14, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 201, 241, or 242. 446 447 448 The Department of Law Enforcement shall exercise all authority granted to it under general law to investigate criminal 449 450 violations under this act and shall refer any evidence of such 451 crimes to the appropriate state attorney for prosecution. 452 Failure of the Department to Law Enforcement to investigate 453 these criminal violations and refer any evidence of such 454 violations to the appropriate officials is a misdemeanor of the 455 first degree under s. 775.15(12)(b). Charges arising out of the 456 criminal investigation shall be brought before a grand jury 457 impaneled in Leon County within 1 year after passage of this 458 act. 459 Section 7. The Governor, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives may sever in whole 460 or in part any section of this act, excluding this section, 461 462 which remaining parts shall be in full force and effect upon 463 becoming law. Notwithstanding severance, Brian Pitts shall 464 retain the right or privilege during future legislative sessions 465 to request the relief severed in whole or in part by virtue of this section until fully remedied. 466

Section 8. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.