

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS

**BILL #:** CS/CS/HB 661 Nursing Home Litigation Reform

**SPONSOR(S):** Health & Human Services Committee; Civil Justice Subcommittee; Gaetz, Harrison and others

**TIED BILLS:** None **IDEN./SIM. BILLS:** SB 1396; CS/SB 1972

REFERENCE	ACTION	ANALYST	STAFF DIRECTOR or BUDGET/POLICY CHIEF
1) Civil Justice Subcommittee	10 Y, 5 N, As CS	Billmeier	Bond
2) Health & Human Services Committee	12 Y, 4 N, As CS	Poche	Gormley
3) Judiciary Committee			

### SUMMARY ANALYSIS

This bill affects nursing home litigation. Specifically, this bill:

- Provides a cap of \$300,000 on noneconomic damages in any claim for wrongful death in nursing home lawsuits, regardless of the number of claimants or defendants;
- Requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if there is a reasonable basis to find that an officer, director or owner of a nursing home acted outside the scope of duties in order for a lawsuit to proceed against an officer, director, or owner of a nursing home;
- Requires a claimant to bring a lawsuit pursuant to either the statute relating to nursing home civil enforcement or the statute relating to abuse of vulnerable adults;
- Changes statutes defining the elements in nursing home litigation cases and punitive damage cases against nursing homes; and
- Requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing before allowing a claim for punitive damages to proceed.

This bill does not appear to have a fiscal impact on state or local governments. This bill might limit recovery amounts for claimants and their attorneys for noneconomic damages and may lower insurance costs paid by nursing homes.

This bill provides an effective date of July 1, 2011, and applies to all causes of action on or after that date.

# FULL ANALYSIS

## I. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

### A. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

#### **Background on Nursing Home Litigation**

This bill revises numerous provisions of law related to litigation against nursing homes. Section 400.022, F.S., enumerates various rights of residents of nursing homes. Section 400.023, F.S., provides for civil enforcement of the rights of nursing home residents. Section 400.023, F.S., was substantially amended in 2001 to deal with the perception of a lack of affordable insurance for nursing homes.<sup>1</sup>

Section 400.023, F.S., provides that any resident whose rights are violated by a nursing home has a cause of action against the nursing home.<sup>2</sup> If the action alleges a claim for resident's rights or for negligence that caused the death of the resident, the claimant<sup>3</sup> is required to elect either survival damages, pursuant to s. 46.021, F.S.,<sup>4</sup> or wrongful death damages, pursuant to s. 768.21, F.S. If the action alleges a claim for resident's rights or for negligence that did not cause the death of the resident, the resident or personal representative of the estate may recover damages for the negligence that caused injury or death to the resident. To prevail in an action pursuant to s. 400.023, F.S., a claimant must show negligence by the defendant or a violation of resident's rights.<sup>5</sup> A claimant may also recover punitive damages in some situations and the claimant's attorney may recover attorney fees in some situations.

Prior to bringing an action, a claimant must provide a notice of intent to initiate litigation. The notice of intent tolls the statute of limitations and allows the claimant and prospective defendants to engage in presuit discovery and mediation. If the case is not settled in this presuit stage, a claimant may file a lawsuit.<sup>6</sup>

The Agency for Health Care Administration provided information on the number of notices of intent filed against nursing homes:

Fiscal Year	# Notices Filed
FY 2009-2010	403
FY 2008-2009	320
FY 2007-2008	357
FY 2006-2007	337
FY 2005-2006	440
FY 2004-2005	471
FY 2003-2004	737
FY 2002-2003	927
FY 2001-2002	1153

<sup>1</sup> See ch. 2001-62, L.O.F. See also Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for CS/CS/SB 1202, April 12, 2001, at pp. 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> The action may be brought by the resident or his or her guardian, by a person or organization acting on behalf of a resident with the consent of the resident or his or her guardian, or by the personal representative of the estate of a deceased resident regardless of the cause of death. See s. 400.023(1), F.S.

<sup>3</sup> Depending on the circumstances, a claimant can be the resident, the estate of the resident, or a family member of the resident.

<sup>4</sup> Section 46.021, F.S., provides that no cause of action dies with a person. If a plaintiff dies during the litigation, the action can continue and the estate can collect damages.

<sup>5</sup> See s. 400.023(2), F.S.

<sup>6</sup> See s. 400.0233, F.S.

This bill makes changes to various provisions of ch. 400, F.S., relating to nursing home litigation. Generally, this bill changes the requirements for suits against officers and directors of nursing homes, changes the distribution of punitive damage awards, provides restrictions on the use of certain evidence in nursing home cases, provides a cap on noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions and requires a more involved evidentiary hearing before the court can allow a claim for punitive damages to proceed. The specific changes are discussed below.

## **Named Defendants and Causes of Action in Nursing Home Cases**

### **Background and Effect of the Bill**

Section 400.023, F.S., provides that "any resident whose rights as specified in this part are violated shall have a cause of action." It does not limit who can be named as a defendant. This bill provides that any resident who alleges negligence or a violation of rights has a cause of action against the "licensee or its management company, as specifically identified in the application for nursing home licensure" and its direct caregiver employees.

Current law provides that ss. 400.023 - 400.0238, F.S., provide the exclusive remedy for a cause of action for personal injury or death of a nursing home resident or a violation of the resident's rights. It further provides that s. 400.023, F.S., "does not preclude theories of recovery not arising out of negligence or s. 400.022 which are available to the resident or to the agency." This bill removes that provision. This bill would provide that ss. 400.023 - 400.0238, F.S., provide the exclusive remedy in resident rights cases and cases involving the personal injury or wrongful death of resident. Any other claims would have to be brought outside of ss. 400.023 - 400.0238, F.S.

## **Liability of Employees, Officers, Directors, or Owners**

### **Background**

In *Estate of Canavan v. National Healthcare Corp.*, 889 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), the court considered whether the managing member of a limited liability company could be held personally liable for damages suffered by a resident in a nursing home. The claimant argued the managing member, Friedbauer, could be held liable:

[Claimant] argues that the concept of piercing the corporate veil does not apply in the case of a tort and that it presented sufficient evidence of Friedbauer negligence, by act or omission, for the jury to reasonably conclude that Friedbauer caused harm to Canavan. [Claimant] argues that Friedbauer had the responsibility of approving the budget for the nursing home. He also functioned as the sole member of the "governing body" of the nursing home, and pursuant to federal regulation, the governing body is legally responsible for establishing and implementing policies regarding the management and operation of the facility and for appointing the administrator who is responsible for the management of the facility. Friedbauer was thus required by federal mandate to create, approve, and implement the facility's policies and procedures. Because he ignored complaints of inadequate staffing while cutting the operating expenses, and because the problems Canavan suffered, pressure sores, infections, poor hygiene, malnutrition and dehydration, were the direct result of understaffing, [claimant] argues that a reasonable jury could have found that Friedbauer's elevation of profit over patient care was negligent.<sup>7</sup>

The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Friedbauer, finding that there was no basis upon which a corporate officer could be held liable. On appeal, the court reversed:

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<sup>7</sup> *Estate of Canavan v. National Healthcare Corp.*, 889 So.2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict because there was evidence by which the jury could have found that Friedbauer's negligence in ignoring the documented problems at the facility contributed to the harm suffered by Canavan. This was not a case in which the plaintiffs were required to pierce the corporate veil in order to establish individual liability because Friedbauer's alleged negligence constituted tortious conduct, which is not shielded from individual liability. We, therefore, reverse the order granting the directed verdict and remand for a new trial against Friedbauer.<sup>8</sup>

### **Effect of this Bill**

This bill provides that a cause of action cannot be asserted against an officer, director, owner, including any designated as having a 'controlling interest'<sup>9</sup> on the application for nursing home licensure, or agent of licensee or management company" unless the court determines there is a reasonable basis that:

- (1) The officer, director, owner, or agent breached, failed to perform, or acted outside the scope of duties as an officer, director, owner, or agent; and
- (2) The breach, failure to perform, or conduct outside the scope of duties is a legal cause of the damage.

The court must make this finding at an evidentiary hearing after considering evidence in the record and evidence proffered by the claimant.

"Scope of duties as an officer, director, owner, or agent" is not defined by this bill. The parties would have to present evidence on what the "scope of duties" of an officer, director, owner, or agent is in each case. The trial judge would then determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that there was a breach of duty that caused damage to the claimant.

### **Cap on Noneconomic Damages**

#### **Background**

Current law provides no cap on the recovery of noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions brought under s. 400.023, F.S. "Economic" damages are damages such as loss of earnings, loss of net accumulations, medical expenses, and funeral expenses.<sup>10</sup> "Noneconomic damages" are damages for which there is no exact standard for fixing compensation, such as mental pain and suffering and loss of companionship or protection.<sup>11</sup>

#### **Effect of this Bill**

This bill provides a cap of \$300,000 on noneconomic damages per resident in any claim for wrongful death brought under s. 400.023, F.S., regardless of the number of claimants or defendants.<sup>12</sup> This bill

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<sup>8</sup> *Estate of Canavan v. National Healthcare Corp.*, 889 So.2d 825, 826-827 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)(citations omitted).

<sup>9</sup> Section 400.071, F.S., governs applications for licensure for nursing homes. It references s. 408.803, F.S., where "controlling interest" is defined. "Controlling interest" means: "(a) The applicant or licensee; (b) A person or entity that serves as an officer of, is on the board of directors of, or has a 5-percent or greater ownership interest in the applicant or licensee; or (c) A person or entity that serves as an officer of, is on the board of directors of, or has a 5-percent or greater ownership interest in the management company or other entity, related or unrelated, with which the applicant or licensee contracts to manage the provider. The term does not include a voluntary board member." s. 408.803(7), F.S.

<sup>10</sup> See generally Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, s. 502.2. (accessed at [http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/civ\\_jury\\_instructions/instructions.shtml#500](http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/civ_jury_instructions/instructions.shtml#500)).

<sup>11</sup> See generally Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, s. 502.2. (accessed at [http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/civ\\_jury\\_instructions/instructions.shtml#500](http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/civ_jury_instructions/instructions.shtml#500)).

<sup>12</sup> See Section III.A.2., Constitutional Issues, of this analysis.

does not cap noneconomic damages in negligence cases that do not involve a wrongful death brought under s. 400.023, F.S.

## Attorney Fees in Actions for Injunctive Relief

### Background and Effect of this Bill

A resident may bring an action seeking injunctive relief in court or bring an administrative action to force a licensee to take an action or cease taking some action. Current law provides that a resident is entitled to attorney fees not to exceed \$25,000 and costs if the resident prevails when seeking injunctive relief. This bill provides that a resident "may" recover attorney fees and costs if the resident prevails.

## Elements in a Civil Actions Under s. 400.023, F.S.

### Background

Section 400.023(2), F.S., provides that in any claim alleging a violation of resident's rights or alleging that negligence caused injury to or the death of a resident, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

- (a) The defendant owed a duty to the resident;
- (b) The defendant breached the duty to the resident;
- (c) The breach of the duty is a legal cause of loss, injury, death, or damage to the resident; and
- (d) The resident sustained loss, injury, death, or damage as a result of the breach.

The Florida Supreme Court has set forth the elements of a negligence action:

1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the [defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the [defendant's] part to conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause," or "proximate cause," and which includes the notion of cause in fact.
4. **Actual loss** or damage...<sup>13</sup> (emphasis added).

Current law provides in any claim brought pursuant to s. 400.023, F.S., a licensee, person, or entity has the duty to exercise "reasonable care" and nurses have the duty to exercise care "consistent with the prevailing professional standard of care."<sup>14</sup> Standards of care are set forth in current law. Section 400.023(3), F.S., provides that a licensee, person, or entity shall have a duty to exercise reasonable care.<sup>15</sup> Nurses have the duty to "exercise care consistent with the prevailing professional standard of care for a nurse."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> *United States v. Stevens*, 994 So.2d 1062, 1066 (Fla. 2008).

<sup>14</sup> See s. 400.023(1), F.S.

<sup>15</sup> "Reasonable care" is defined as "that degree of care which a reasonably careful licensee, person, or entity would use under like circumstances." Section 400.023(3), F.S.

<sup>16</sup> "The prevailing professional standard of care for a nurse shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar nurses." s. 400.023(4), F.S.

## Effect of this Bill

This bill provides:

In any claim brought pursuant to this part alleging a violation of resident's rights or negligence causing injury to or the death of a resident, the claimant shall have the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

- (a) The defendant **breached the applicable standard of care; and**
- (b) The breach is a legal cause of **actual** loss, injury, death, or damage to the resident. (emphasis added).

This bill provides that a claimant bringing a claim pursuant to ch. 400, F.S., must show the defendant breached the applicable standard of care and that the breach is the legal cause of actual loss, injury, death, or damage. The "actual" loss addition to the statute is from Florida Supreme Court case law.

## Punitive Damages

Current law provides for recovery of punitive damages by a claimant. Punitive damages "are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."<sup>17</sup> Punitive damages are generally limited to three times the amount of compensatory damages or \$1 million, whichever is greater.<sup>18</sup> Damages can exceed \$1 million if the jury finds that the wrongful conduct was motivated primarily by unreasonable financial gain and determines that the unreasonably dangerous nature of the conduct, together with the high likelihood of injury resulting from the conduct, was actually known by the managing agent, director, officer, or other person responsible for making policy decisions on behalf of the defendant.<sup>19</sup> If the jury finds that the defendant had a specific intent to harm the claimant and determines that the defendant's conduct did in fact harm the claimant, there is be no cap on punitive damages.<sup>20</sup>

## Background - Evidentiary Requirements to Bring a Punitive Damages Claims

Section 400.0237(1), F.S., provides:

In any action for damages brought under this part, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may move to amend her or his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil procedure. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages. No discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the pleading concerning punitive damages is permitted.

A court discussed how a claimant can make a proffer to assert a punitive damage claim:

[A] 'proffer' according to traditional notions of the term, connotes merely an 'offer' of evidence and neither the term standing alone nor the statute itself calls for an adjudication of the underlying veracity of that which is submitted, much less for countervailing evidentiary submissions. Therefore, a proffer is merely a representation of what evidence the defendant proposes to present and is not actual evidence. A reasonable showing by evidence in the record would typically include depositions,

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<sup>17</sup> *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).

<sup>18</sup> See s. 400.0238(1)(a), F.S.

<sup>19</sup> See s. 400.0238(1)(b), F.S.

<sup>20</sup> See s. 400.0238(1)(c), F.S.

interrogatories, and requests for admissions that have been filed with the court. Hence, an evidentiary hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is offered and scrutinized under the pertinent evidentiary rules, as in a trial, is neither contemplated nor mandated by the statute in order to determine whether a reasonable basis has been established to plead punitive damages.<sup>21 22</sup>

Punitive damages claims are often raised after the initial complaint has been filed. Once a claimant has discovered enough evidence that the claimant believes justifies a punitive damage claim, the claimant files a motion to amend the complaint to add a punitive damage action. The trial judge considers the evidence presented and proffered by the claimant to determine whether the claim should proceed.

### **Effect of this Bill - Evidentiary Requirements to Bring a Punitive Damages Claims**

This bill provides that a claimant may not bring a claim for punitive damages unless there is a showing of admissible evidence proffered by the parties that provides a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages. This bill requires the trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The trial judge must find there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant will be able to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. The effect of these requirements is (1) to limit the trial judge's consideration to admissible evidence. Current law does not require a showing of admissibility at this stage of the proceedings; and (2) to provide that the claimant and defendant may present evidence and have the trial judge weigh the evidence to make its determination. Current law contemplates that the claimant will proffer evidence and the court, considering the proffer in the light most favorable to the claimant, will determine whether there is a reasonable basis to allow the claimant's punitive damages case to proceed.<sup>23 24</sup>

Current law provides that the rules of civil procedure are to be liberally construed to allow the claimant discovery of admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages. This bill removes that provision from statute. Discovery in civil cases is governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the rules govern discovery, it is not clear what effect, if any, removing this provision from statute would have on current practice.

### **Background - Individual Liability for Punitive Damages**

Section 400.0237(2), F.S., provides:

A defendant may be held liable for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct<sup>25</sup> or gross negligence.<sup>26</sup>

### **Effect of this Bill - Individual Liability for Punitive Damages**

This bill provides that a defendant, including the licensee or management company against whom punitive damages is sought, may be held liable for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that "a specific individual or corporate defendant actively and knowingly participated in intentional misconduct or engaged in conduct that constituted gross negligence and contributed to the loss, damages, or injury" suffered by the claimant.

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<sup>21</sup> *Estate of Despain v. Avante Group, Inc.*, 900 So.2d 637, 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)(internal citations omitted).

<sup>22</sup> The *Despain* court was discussing a prior version of the punitive damages statute relating to nursing home litigation but the language in that statute is the same in that statute and current law.

<sup>23</sup> See *Estate of Despain v. Avante Group, Inc.*, 900 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

<sup>24</sup> See Section III.A.2., Constitutional Issues, of this analysis.

<sup>25</sup> "Intentional misconduct" is actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high probability that injury or damage to the claimant will result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally pursuing a course of conduct that results in injury or damage. See s. 400.0237(2)(a), F.S.

<sup>26</sup> "Gross negligence" is conduct that is reckless or wanting in care such that it constitutes a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct. See s. 400.0237(2)(b), F.S.

The current standard jury instructions provide for punitive damages if the defendant was "personally guilty of intentional misconduct."<sup>27</sup> This bill requires that the defendant "actively and knowingly participated in intentional misconduct."

### **Background - Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages**

Punitive damages claims are sometimes brought under a theory of vicarious liability where an employer is held responsible for the acts of an employee. Section 400.0273(3), F.S., provides:

In the case of an employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity, punitive damages may be imposed for the conduct of an employee or agent only if the conduct of the employee or agent meets the criteria specified in subsection (2)<sup>28</sup> and:

- (a) The employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity actively and knowingly participated in such conduct;
- (b) The officers, directors, or managers of the employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity condoned, ratified, or consented to such conduct; or
- (c) The employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity engaged in conduct that constituted gross negligence and that contributed to the loss, damages, or injury suffered by the claimant.

### **Effect of this Bill - Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages**

This bill provides that in the case of vicarious liability of an employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity, punitive damages may not imposed for the conduct of an employee or agent unless:

- A specifically identified employee or agent actively and knowingly participated in intentional misconduct or engaged in conduct that constituted gross negligence and contributed to the loss, damages, or injury suffered by the claimant; and
- An officer, director, or manager of the actual employer, corporation, or legal entity condoned, ratified, or consented to the specific conduct alleged.

This bill provides a severability clause. If a portion, or portions, of the bill is found to be invalid, the remaining valid portions of the bill retain full applicability.

### **Effective Date**

This bill takes effect on July 1, 2011, and applies to causes of action arising on or after that date.

#### **B. SECTION DIRECTORY:**

**Section 1:** Amends s. 400.023, F.S., relating to civil enforcement.

**Section 2:** Amends s. 400.0237, F.S., relating to punitive damages; pleading; burden of proof.

**Section 3:** Creates an unnumbered section of law providing for severability.

**Section 4:** Provides that this bill takes effect on July 1, 2011, and applies to causes of action accruing on or after that date.

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<sup>27</sup> Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, 503.1, Punitive Damages - Bifurcated Procedure.

<sup>28</sup> Criteria are whether the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.



## II. FISCAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT

### A. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENT:

#### 1. Revenues:

None.

#### 2. Expenditures:

None.

### B. FISCAL IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

#### 1. Revenues:

None.

#### 2. Expenditures:

None.

### C. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR:

None.

### D. FISCAL COMMENTS:

None.

## III. COMMENTS

### A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

#### 1. Applicability of Municipality/County Mandates Provision:

Not Applicable. This bill does not appear to affect county or municipal governments.

#### 2. Other:

#### Authority of the Supreme Court to Adopt Court Rules

Article V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const., provides that the Supreme Court shall adopt rules of practice and procedure in the courts.

Section 2 of this bill requires the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing relating to the issues of punitive damages. It can be argued this bill requires the court to adopt a specific procedure. However, requirements that trial judges hold hearings on punitive damage claims have been in law since at least 2001 and to date no court has held those provisions unconstitutional.

#### Access to Courts

Lines 70-72 of this bill provides a cap on noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions brought under section 400.023, F.S. Caps on noneconomic damages are subject to review under art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. The constitution provides that the courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay. In *Kluger v. White*, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court held that:

[w]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided...the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a

reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.<sup>29</sup>

The Florida Supreme Court in *Kluger* invalidated a statute that required a minimum of \$550 in property damages arising from an automobile accident before a lawsuit could be brought. Based upon the *Kluger* test, the Florida Supreme Court has also invalidated a portion of a tort reform statute that placed a cap on all noneconomic damages because the statute did not provide claimants with a commensurate benefit.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the Legislature cannot restrict damages by either enacting a minimum damage amount or a monetary cap on damages without meeting the *Kluger* test.

The caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, found in ss. 766.207 and 766.209, F.S., have been found by the Florida Supreme Court to meet the *Kluger* test and are not violative of the access to courts provision in the Florida Constitution. In *University of Miami v. Echarte*, 618 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1993), the court ruled that the arbitration scheme met both prongs of the *Kluger* test. First, the court held that the arbitration scheme provided claimants with a commensurate benefit for the loss of the right to fully recover noneconomic damages as the claimant has the opportunity to receive prompt recovery without the risk and uncertainty of litigation or having to prove fault in a civil trial. Additionally, the claimant benefits from: reduced costs of attorney and expert witness fees which would be required to prove liability; joint and several liability of multiple defendants; prompt payment of damages after determination by the arbitration panel; interest penalties against the defendant for failure to promptly pay the arbitration award; and limited appellate review of the arbitration award.

Second, the court in *Echarte* ruled that, even if the medical malpractice arbitration statutes did not provide a commensurate benefit, the statutes satisfied the second prong of *Kluger* which requires a legislative finding that an overpowering public necessity exists, and further that no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. The court found that the Legislature's factual and policy findings of a medical malpractice crisis constituted an overpowering public necessity. The court also ruled that the record supported the conclusion that no alternative or less onerous method existed for meeting the public necessity of ending the medical malpractice crisis. The court explained, "...it is clear that both the arbitration statute, with its conditional limits on recovery of noneconomic damages, and the strengthened regulation of the medical profession are necessary to meet the medical malpractice insurance crisis."<sup>31</sup>

This bill limits the recovery of noneconomic damages. If the cap is challenged, the court would scrutinize this limitation based on the rulings in *Kluger* and its progeny. Accordingly, the court would have to determine whether this bill provided a claimant with a reasonable alternative to the right to recover full noneconomic damages. If not, the court would look to see whether this bill was a response to an overpowering public necessity and that no alternative method of meeting such public necessity could have been shown.

**B. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY:**

None.

**C. DRAFTING ISSUES OR OTHER COMMENTS:**

None.

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<sup>29</sup> *Kluger v. White*, 281 So2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).

<sup>30</sup> *See Smith v. Dept. of Insurance*, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).

<sup>31</sup> *University of Miami v. Echarte*, 618 So.2d 189, 195-197 (Fla. 1993).

#### **IV. AMENDMENTS/ COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE CHANGES**

The Civil Justice Subcommittee considered this bill on April 1, 2011, and adopted six amendments. One amendment removed a provision that limited a claimant's ability to prevent evidence of understaffing. The other amendments made technical changes. The bill, as amended, was reported favorably as a committee substitute.

On April 25, 2011, the Health and Human Services Committee adopted six amendments. The amendments:

- Add a severability clause; if any portion(s) of the act is found to be invalid, the portions of the bill that remain valid retain their full applicability.
- Deletes language that would have given a nursing home a rebuttable presumption of appropriate staffing if the nursing home showed compliance with state minimum staffing requirements provided in part II of chapter 400, F.S.
- Deletes language that would have limited the admissibility of AHCA surveys in actions against nursing homes.
- Removes language that would have ensured that 50 percent of moneys received through a settlement agreement by a claimant in an action against a nursing home would go to the state's Quality Improvement Trust Fund.
- Removes language that would have prevented a federal or state survey report from establishing a claim for punitive damages.
- Deletes language that would have prohibited a cause of action under s. 415.1111, F.S., against an employee, officer, director, owner, or agent of a licensee or management company.
- Deletes language that would have required a claimant to elect damages at the end of the discovery process, but no later than 60 days prior to trial.
- Raises the cap on non-economic damages from \$250,000 per resident to \$300,000 per resident, regardless of the number of claimants or defendants in an action.

The bill was reported favorably as a Committee Substitute. The analysis reflects the Committee Substitute.