By Senator Bullard

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A bill to be entitled

An act for the relief of Brian Pitts; directing the Division of Administrative Hearings to appoint an administrative law judge or special master to determine a basis for equitable relief for the purpose of compensating Mr. Pitts for the wrongful acts or omissions of the State of Florida or officials thereof; requiring a report to the Legislature; authorizing compensation to Mr. Pitts upon a determination by an administrative law judge; providing an appropriation to compensate Mr. Pitts for injuries and damages sustained; providing a limitation on attorney fees and costs; directing that certain court orders and judgments be declared null and void; specifying the limited circumstances under which Mr. Pitts may represent himself or others in judicial or administrative proceedings; directing the Department of Law Enforcement to investigate certain illegal acts committed by certain persons; authorizing the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Governor to sever portions of this act under certain circumstances; providing an effective date.

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WHEREAS, this state has clearly recognized the practice of law by lay persons since at least 1980 as declared in The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980) and The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So.2d 1178, 1180-1181, 1183-1184

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(Fla. 1997), the Legislature and judiciary having concurrent jurisdiction to regulate such, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts has exercised this privilege since 2001 in Pinellas County, and his practice was later confirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in case number SC02-247, in a final order dated November 6, 2003, at clause (1) declaring "unless otherwise authorized by Florida Statutes, court rule, case law, administrative rule, or the rules regulating The Florida Bar," and

WHEREAS, since the inception of Mr. Pitts' practice, the Second District Court of Appeal, the Sixth Judicial Circuit, the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, and The Florida Bar have, without cause, continued to deprive Mr. Pitts of the privilege of practicing law as prescribed by the Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court, subjecting him to civil and criminal proceedings and penalties on an ongoing basis, and

WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court, by virtue of the broad, general, and ambiguous language of its 2003 final order in case number SC02-247, has subjected Mr. Pitts to entrapment, and has needlessly and unjustly avoided and failed upon many requests by Mr. Pitts to clarify or amend the final order or to promulgate court rules through The Florida Bar following original proceedings brought or suggested by Mr. Pitts to correct the matter, and

WHEREAS, this course of misconduct has been ongoing from 2001 to 2012, such that the courts, The Florida Bar, and the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit being in continual collusion against Mr. Pitts in cases SC02-

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247, SC06-1279, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, CTC03-01887MMANO, and CTC03-09855MMANO, and such action has resulted in the wrongful and unlawful incarceration of Mr. Pitts in the Pinellas County Jail for a total of nearly 1 year, and

WHEREAS, the purpose of this course of misconduct was to retaliate against Mr. Pitts and, by way of his detainment, to thwart his pending pro se actions for relief from said collusion by civil, appellate, or original proceedings regarding the criminal cases, and

WHEREAS, appearing pro se in many of his cases, Mr. Pitts was complimented by several judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit for an exceptional degree of technical and performance competence that would be expected of an experienced member of The Florida Bar, yet he was informed by express or implied communication that he would not receive the relief requested in any given proceeding unless represented by a member of The Florida Bar, as a matter of camaraderie, and

WHEREAS, though appearing pro se in said cases and other actions seeking relief from said collusion, Mr. Pitts was at times represented by appointed counsel; however, such proceedings proved to be futile because the proceedings were staged by the courts and the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit to be illusory. The courts failed to abide by binding precedent and stare decisis, where applicable, as well as Florida Rules of Court, as evidenced by the series of filings in each case by Mr. Pitts, or his court-appointed counsel, hence depriving Mr. Pitts of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, self-representation,

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and representation by counsel under the United States Constitution, and

WHEREAS, the Second District Court of Appeal has declared in Denson v. State, 711 So.2d 1225, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) that "appellate judges take an oath to uphold the law and the constitution of this state. The citizens of this state properly expect these judges to protect their rights. When reviewing an appeal with a preserved issue, if we discover that a person has been subjected to a patently illegal sentence to which no objection was lodged in the trial court, neither the constitution nor our own consciences will allow us to remain silent and hope that the prisoner, untrained in the law, will somehow discover the error and request its correction. If three appellate judges, like a statue of the 'see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil' monkeys, declined to consider such serious, patent errors, we would jeopardize the public's trust and confidence in the institution of courts of law." Compare, Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1994), and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts contends that the trial judges and appellate judges have deliberately and intentionally, in concert with the Florida Supreme Court justices, failed to abide by said rules of law as to Mr. Pitts' cases on appeal or by original proceedings brought and maintained by him or his counsel, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts believes that The Florida Bar, the Office of the State Attorney, and the judges and justices involved at each level of Mr. Pitts' cases all have a personal and private interest in deterring Mr. Pitts from engaging in the authorized practice of law as prescribed in this state and, thus, have failed to afford Mr. Pitts the required process and

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means of justice or resolution as normally expected of esteemed persons in their official capacities, and

WHEREAS, the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office participated in the concerted effort of the courts, The Florida Bar, and the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit illegally incarcerating Mr. Pitts in the Pinellas County Jail from January 2003 through April 2004 and from March 22, 2010, through July 4, 2010, by refusing him administrative alternative sentencing without cause, and by subjecting him to living conditions and circumstances in violation of Florida Model Jail Standards (2.15)(c); (4.12); (4.13); (4.15); (5.08)(a), (c)(1)-(8), and j; (6.02); (9.06)(b); (9.08); (9.10); (10.01); (11.12); (11.16); (12.03) (d) -(i); and (12.06), Appendix A, and in violation of ss. 951.03 and 951.033(3), Florida Statutes, and by extending his sentence an additional 50 days in violation of Inmate Handbook XI. A., Florida Model Jail Standard (4.16), and ss. 951.21(1) and 921.16(1), Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment and false imprisonment and denying him due process and equal protection of the law. See Miller v. Carson, 599 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Solomos v. Jenne, 776 So.2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); and Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), and WHEREAS, such conditions and circumstances of the jail are reflected in a St. Petersburg Times article dated July 5, 2010, and published under the headline "Thousands of Pinellas jail inmates released without a judge ever setting bail," which was

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complemented by a series of articles published by the Orlando Sentinel under the respective headlines "Florida's suspect jails: The state's hands-off approach to inspecting jails leaves them vulnerable," dated April 8, 2010; "Jail-standards chief defends system of checks," dated May 15, 2010; "If all Central Florida jails rate an A, is it deserved?" dated May 15, 2010; "Beef up jail oversight: Florida jails need tough oversight, not coddling," dated May 18, 2010; and other articles, and

WHEREAS, such misconduct is a clear abuse of judicial, executive, and administrative authority as to the state court system and local government, including the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, thereby resulting in a public embarrassment to this state since said authorities knew there was no basis in fact or law for their unlawful acts against Mr. Pitts, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts' good name and reputation have been damaged; he has been deprived of due process, the ability to conduct a lawful business, freedom of speech, property, liberty, and equal protection of the law; he has not benefited from constitutional protections against unlawful trusts by public officers and employees under oath of office and double jeopardy as to criminal proceedings and sanctions; he has suffered mental anguish and emotional distress as the result of the intentional misconduct and gross negligence of the courts, the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, The Florida Bar, and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office relating to his practice of law as a nonlawyer in this state, and, further, there is no state-action exception to federal antitrust laws, which were violated in the subject cases, and

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WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts has suffered, and continues to suffer, significant monetary damage by virtue of expenses, fees, fines, costs, restitution, and lost income, property, and time resulting from the civil and criminal proceedings relating to his alleged unauthorized or unlicensed practice of law, and

WHEREAS, Mr. Pitts frequently appears before the Legislature to instruct, advise, and inform members and to advocate for or against proposed legislation covering a broad spectrum of topics and subject matter in fact and law, always demonstrating an exceptional degree of technical and performance competence that would be expected of any trained and experienced member of The Florida Bar, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature recognizes that no system of justice is impervious to human error, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature acknowledges that the state's system of justice sometimes yields imperfect results that may have tragic consequences, and

WHEREAS, this claim is based on a moral and legal obligation of the Legislature to acknowledge its actions and act on its authority to correct a wrong, when those actions have resulted in a manifest injustice or disregard for the law, and

WHEREAS, the filing of this claim bill is in accord with holdings of the Florida Supreme Court concerning legislative claim bills. See Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit v. Dep't of Natural Res., 339 So.2d 1113, 1116-1117 (Fla. 1976) ("Absent legislation waiving the state's sovereign immunity . . . this Court cannot authorize relief through the judicial process"); Gerard v. Dep't of Transp., 472 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1985) ("[W]e agree with the Department of Transportation's

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assertion that a judgment in this case was not a prerequisite to Gerard's filing a claims bill in the legislature."), and

WHEREAS, the First District Court of Appeal in Jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So.2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), stated that although the Legislature has placed limits on recovery, "claimants remain free to seek legislative relief bills, as they did during days of complete sovereign immunity," and

WHEREAS, the Florida Supreme Court in *Dickinson v. Bradley*, 298 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1974), held that "any claim bill is restricted to less than the general public and its purpose is to discharge the state's moral obligation to any individual or other entity whom or which the legislature recognizes as being entitled to such. . . . The legislature may enact a claim bill for what would be a tort if a private party was involved just as effectively as for what would constitute a contractual debt," and

WHEREAS, the Legislature intends that any compensation made pursuant to this act be the sole compensation provided by the state for any and all present and future claims arising out of the facts presented in this act, NOW, THEREFORE,

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. The facts stated in the preamble to this act are found and declared to be true, and all judicial and administrative remedies have been exhausted. This act is the remedy of last resort available to Mr. Pitts.

Section 2. The Division of Administrative Hearings shall

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appoint an administrative law judge or special master to conduct a hearing and determine a basis for equitable relief for the purpose of compensating Mr. Pitts for any wrongful act or omission of the State of Florida, the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, and the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office regarding investigations involving Mr. Pitts, the civil and criminal proceedings relating to Mr. Pitts' alleged unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law, and his incarcerations totaling nearly 12 months from 2001 to 2012, if not longer.

master shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the State of Florida, the Office of the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, or the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office committed a wrongful act or omission and whether a basis for equitable relief exists, and if it so finds, the administrative law judge or special master shall award Mr. Pitts an amount of up to \$7 million, but not less than \$1 million, to be paid proportionately by the parties that wronged him and to be paid in lump sum or in payments over a period of no more than 10 years.

(2) The administrative law judge or special master shall report his or her determination to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives by July 1, 2013. The Chief Financial Officer is directed to draw a warrant in satisfaction of the relief awarded by the administrative law judge or special master, as provided in this act, and to pay the warrant out of the Administrative Trust Fund or State Courts

Revenue Trust Fund within the state courts system and the State

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262 Attorneys Revenue Trust Fund to Brian Pitts. Pinellas County is 263 directed to and shall pay the warrant out of its general revenue 264 fund or by other means it has provided for to pay valid claims 265 against the local government as pertains to the Pinellas County 266 Sheriff's Office and as to its share of the total award to Mr. 267 Pitts.

- (3) This award is intended to provide the sole compensation for all present and future claims arising out of the factual situation described in this act which resulted in unlawful or unconstitutional acts committed against Mr. Pitts. The total amount paid for attorney fees, lobbying fees, costs, and other similar expenses relating to this claim may not exceed 25 percent of the amount awarded under this act.
- (4) All final orders, judgments, decrees, and convictions, and orders or liens pertaining to fees, fines, costs, and restitution, rendered in cases SC06-1279, SC02-247, CRCAB-90407CFANO, CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03-01887MMANO, wherein Mr. Pitts is the respondent or defendant, are void and are annulled by this act by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers because the courts failed to recognize the Legislature's lawful and valid enactments authorizing lay representation as expressed in The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412, 416-418 (Fla. 1980); by virtue of inherent authority of this Legislature as expressed in Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So.2d 601, 611 (Fla. 2008), Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 918, 919 (Fla. 1985); and by virtue of checks and balances exercised by this Legislature as expressed in State Ex Rel.

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291 Young v. Duval County, 79 So. 692, 697 (Fla. 1918), in which the 292 court found "[a] clear violation of the constitutional 293 provisions dividing the powers of government into departments 294 should be checked and remedied." As the court found in State v. 295 City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 346 (Fla. 1929), "[t]he general 296 rule is that the Legislature is supreme in the legislative 297 field, which is the most powerful branch of government, so long 298 as it does not violate any of the provisions of the organic law. 299 There is to our minds no justifiable exception of any class of 300 legislation from this all-pervasive and fundamental principle." 301 (5) The clerk of the court for the Florida Supreme Court, 302 as to cases SC06-1279 and SC02-247, and the clerk of the court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, as to cases CRCAB-90407CFANO, 303 304 CRCAB-65835CFANO, CRC07-12964CFANO, CTC07-03965MMANO, CTC03-305 09855MMANO, CTC03-01885MMANO, and CTC03-01887MMANO, all 306 pertaining to Mr. Pitts, are hereby directed to remove from 307 public and private access all dockets, records, documents, and 308 recorded orders or liens related to those cases and transmit 309 them to the Department of Law Enforcement to fulfill the duties 310 required under section 6 of this act. The Department of Law 311 Enforcement is hereby directed to remove from public and private 312 access all record history and information of a criminal nature concerning Mr. Pitts. This includes, but is not limited to, 313 fingerprints, felon registration, and all other matters 314 315 concerning the case numbers cited in this subsection. The 316 records, information, or documents may not be used by or 317 accessed for any purpose by anyone unless access to those 318 records is required by federal authorities or for investigations 319 conducted under section 6 of this act.

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(6) The Department of Law Enforcement is directed to ensure the compliance, execution, and enforcement of subsections (4) and (5) of this section, and shall provide protective services to Mr. Pitts ensuring his rights, privileges, and safety under sections 4, 5, and 6 of this act.

Section 4. In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court's final order in case number SC02-247 and the exception contained in clause (1) of that ruling, unless otherwise authorized by Florida Statutes, court rule, case law, administrative rule, or the rules regulating The Florida Bar, thereby authorizing Mr. Pitts to practice law in this state, the Legislature authorizes Mr. Pitts to practice law in this state under the following designations, titles, rules, decisions, or acts in the capacity of lay counselor or lay representative:

- (1) Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, relating to a qualified representative.
- (2) Chapter 44, Florida Statutes, relating to a designated representative.
- (3) Chapter 709, Florida Statutes, relating to an attorney-in-fact and durable power of attorney, including an interest in any personal or property claim, election, right, or interest.
- (4) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to representation by a realty property manager.
- (5) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to a nonlawyer using approved forms.
- (6) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court relating to representation in county or small claims civil proceedings.
 - (7) Decisions or rules of the Florida Supreme Court

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relating to third-party standing.

- (8) Rule 5-15, Rules Relating to Admission to The Florida Bar.
 - (9) Judicial discretion under the inherent authority doctrine.
 - (10) Federal law or any other clearly expressed rule, statute, or court or administrative decision or order under other federal, state, or local law and authority.

Section 5. Any appearance or public testimony given by Mr. Pitts on bills or matters before the Legislature does not constitute the practice of law. In all circumstances Mr. Pitts retains the right to represent himself at any time he has valid standing supported by law. If Mr. Pitts is the subject of civil, administrative, or criminal proceedings, he retains the right to represent himself without a lawyer.

Section 6. <u>Due to the period of ongoing misconduct against</u>
Mr. Pitts as described in this act, the Legislature directs the

Department of Law Enforcement, assisted by Mr. Pitts, to

investigate these acts committed by:

(1) The Florida Supreme Court justices involved for violations of ss. 914.22(2)(f) or (4)(f), Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 1512, relating to their final ruling rendered on February 22, 2010, in case SC06-1279 resulting in the incarceration of Mr. Pitts on the eve of the 2010 legislative session while proceedings on Senate Bill 58 were pending, and other violations of ss. 775.15(12)(b), 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 839.13(1), 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 1951, and 1962.

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(2) The Second District Court of Appeal judges assigned to Mr. Pitts' cases on motions, reviews, and original proceedings; the Sixth Judicial Circuit judges; and the state attorneys involved for violations of ss. 775.15(12)(b), 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 839.13(1), 839.24, 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 895.03, and 918.13, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 1951, and 1962.

- (3) The Florida Bar and its representatives, who pursued charges of unlicensed practice of law against Mr. Pitts, for violations of ss. 777.04(2) and (3), 836.05, 839.13(1), 895.03, and 918.13, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 1951, and 1962, as well as s. 542.21(2), Florida Statutes, and 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3, relating to the practice of law by lawyers and nonlawyers.
- (4) The Pinellas County Sheriff's Office for violations of ss. 775.15(12)(b), 839.13(1), 843.03, 843.0855(2) and (3), 876.10, 950.09, and 951.14, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. 241 or 242.

The Department of Law Enforcement shall exercise all authority it has under general law to investigate criminal violations under this act and shall refer any evidence of such crimes to the appropriate officials for prosecution. Charges arising out of the criminal investigation shall be brought before a grand jury impaneled in Leon County within 1 year after passage of this act.

Section 7. The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the Governor may sever in whole or in part any section of this act, excluding this section 7, which

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407	remaining parts shall be in full force and effect upon becoming
408	law. Notwithstanding severance, Brian Pitts shall retain the
409	right or privilege during future legislative sessions to request
410	the relief severed in part or whole by virtue of this section
411	until fully remedied.
412	Section 8. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.

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