

The Florida Senate
BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT

(This document is based on the provisions contained in the legislation as of the latest date listed below.)

Prepared By: The Professional Staff of the Committee on Rules

BILL: SB 1220

INTRODUCER: Senators Brodeur and Perry

SUBJECT: Defamation and Related Actions

DATE: April 4, 2023

REVISED: _____

	ANALYST	STAFF DIRECTOR	REFERENCE	ACTION
1.	<u>Collazo</u>	<u>Cibula</u>	<u>JU</u>	Favorable
2.	<u>Collazo</u>	<u>Twogood</u>	<u>RC</u>	Pre-meeting

I. Summary:

SB 1220 creates and amends several statutes relating to defamation causes of action. The most significant changes purport to reduce a plaintiff’s burden of proof necessary to prevail in a defamation action. More specifically, the bill creates statutes providing that:

- Defamation actions include actions for libel, slander, and other recognized causes of action like defamation by implication.
- The publication of an altered or unaltered photograph, video, or audio recording may form the basis of a defamation action.
- A person is not a public figure for purposes of a defamation action if the person acquires fame or notoriety from engaging in certain specified activities.
- A defamatory allegation is made with actual malice for purposes of a defamation action if certain specified criteria apply.
- If the actual malice standard otherwise applies to a defamation action in which the defendant does not identify the source for a defamatory statement, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant acted negligently in making the defamatory statement.
- In a defamation action based on an alleged defamatory statement that does not relate to the reasons for the plaintiff’s status as a public figure, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant acted negligently in making or repeating the statement.

The bill amends the statute governing venue for defamation actions, to provide that venue for such actions is proper in any county identified in the general venue statute, including any county where the defamatory material is accessed by a third party.

The bill also amends:

- The statute codifying the journalist’s privilege, to provide that it does not apply to defamation or related actions against a professional journalist.
- Two anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) statutes, to provide that a defendant in an action for defamation or similar action who files a motion to dismiss or

motion for summary judgment under those statutes is entitled to attorney fees and costs only if the allegedly defamatory statement was not negligently made.

The bill takes effect July 1, 2023.

II. Present Situation:

Defamation

Generally

Defamation is the unprivileged publication of false statements that naturally and proximately result in an injury to another.¹ It has also been described as a statement that tends to harm the reputation of another by lowering him or her in the estimation of the community or, more broadly stated, one that exposes a plaintiff to hatred, ridicule, or contempt or injures his business, reputation, or occupation.²

The Florida Constitution provides that every person may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects, but will be responsible for the abuse of that right.³ The law of defamation embodies the public policy that individuals should be free to enjoy their reputations unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks. An action for defamation is based upon a violation of this right.⁴

Different states vary in their anti-defamation statutes; as such, courts in different states will interpret defamation laws differently, and defamation statutes will vary somewhat from state to state.⁵ But generally, defamation may take one of three forms:

- Spoken words, commonly known as “slander.”⁶
- A written statement, commonly known as “libel.”⁷
- An implication, commonly known as “false light” invasion of privacy.⁸

Before 2008, Florida courts recognized separate causes of action for slander and libel premised upon spoken or written defamatory statements, but did not recognize a separate cause of action for defamation itself.⁹ However, in 2008, the Florida Supreme Court recognized a standalone tort of defamation,¹⁰ and in doing so effectively subsumed all claims for slander and libel into that

¹ *Hoch v. Loren*, 273 So. 3d 56, 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (internal citation omitted).

² *Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp*, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1108-09 (Fla. 2008) (internal citation omitted).

³ FLA. CONST. art. I, s. 4.

⁴ 19 FLA. JUR. 2D s. 1 *Defamation and Privacy*.

⁵ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, *Defamation*, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation> (last visited Mar. 15, 2023).

⁶ See *Spears v. Albertson's, Inc.*, 848 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (providing that “[s]lander may be defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words”).

⁷ See *Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Association*, 193 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that under Florida law, libel is defined as the unprivileged written publication of false statements).

⁸ See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS s. 652E.

⁹ See *Delacruz v. Peninsula State Bank*, 221 So. 2d 772, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (explaining that there is no such legal cause of action as ‘defamation’ and “[l]ibel and slander may be Founded [sic] on defamation, but the right of action itself is libel or slander, depending upon whether it is written or oral”).

¹⁰ See *Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1105-08 (comparing the false light cause of action to the defamation by implication cause of action, and recognizing the existence of only the latter in Florida).

tort. Therefore, defamation now encompasses both libel and slander.¹¹ False light is not recognized as a separate cause of action in Florida, but like slander and libel, it is nearly identical to a form of defamation, known as “defamation by implication.”¹²

Although libel is generally perpetrated by written communication, it also includes defamation through the publication of pictures or photographs.¹³ Alteration of a photograph may support a defamation action.¹⁴

Cause of Action

In Florida, the five required elements of a claim for defamation are:

- Publication.
- Falsity.
- Knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person.
- Actual damages.
- A defamatory statement.¹⁵

“Publication” is a required element because a defamatory statement does not become actionable until it is published or communicated to a third person.¹⁶ Publication requires proof that the statement is exposed to the public so it may be read or heard by a third person, but not necessarily that it has in fact been read or heard by a third person.¹⁷

The element of “falsity” requires that the defamation be “of and concerning” the plaintiff,¹⁸ and that the allegation or representation about the plaintiff be false.¹⁹ The falsity may be premised upon untruthfulness, such as in the case of slander or libel, or from truthful statements that imply falsely, such as in the case of defamation by implication.²⁰

An actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person.²¹ With respect to this element, case law has developed which purports to balance the interests of the First

¹¹ *Norkin v. The Florida Bar*, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1303-04 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (internal citations omitted); *Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc.*, 22 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1247 fn. 2 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

¹² *See Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1108 (comparing the false light cause of action to the defamation by implication cause of action, and recognizing the existence of only the latter in Florida); *but see* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS s. 652E (recognizing a separate tort of false light).

¹³ 19 FLA. JUR. 2D *Defamation and Privacy* s. 15 (citing 50 AM. JUR. 2D *Libel and Slander* s. 153).

¹⁴ 50 AM. JUR. 2D *Libel and Slander* s. 153 (internal citations omitted).

¹⁵ *Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1106.

¹⁶ *American Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes*, 960 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

¹⁷ *Axiom Worldwide, Inc. v. Becerra*, 2009 WL 1347398, *7 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citing *Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc.*, 220 Ga. 485, 139 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1964) (noting, in applying single publication rule to newspaper, that “whether or not it is read is immaterial once it is shown that it was exposed to public view”).

¹⁸ *Thomas v. Jacksonville Television, Inc.*, 699 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

¹⁹ *See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “only defamatory statements that are capable of being proved false are subject to liability under state libel law”).

²⁰ *Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1106-08.

²¹ *Id.* at 1106.

Amendment while also protecting people from being unjustly defamed.²² Accordingly, courts apply an actual malice standard, which is addressed separately and in more detail below, to public figures, and a simple negligence standard to private individuals.²³ A private individual may recover actual damages from a media defendant that publishes false and defamatory statements and that fails to use reasonable care to determine their falsity.²⁴

With respect to the element of actual damages, the recovery of actual damages depends upon whether the defamation was “per se” or “per quod.” Defamation per se generally relieves plaintiffs of having to prove damages, because such statements are so inherently damaging that damages are typically presumed.²⁵ On the other hand, defamation per quod generally requires plaintiffs to provide supporting and extrinsic evidence in order to prove that the statement or publication was actually defamatory.²⁶

Finally, the statements must actually be defamatory. To make this determination, courts consider allegedly defamatory statements in their totality. For example, they consider all the words, pictures, and illustrations as used and presented together, not just a particular phrase or sentence in isolation.²⁷ An allegedly defamatory statement should be considered in its natural sense without a forced or strained construction.²⁸ Courts also make threshold determinations regarding whether a claim should even be considered by a jury,²⁹ and whether a privilege applies.³⁰

Defenses

In addition to general procedural and other defenses that may be available (e.g. a failure to allege and prove any of the elements of defamation), the following specific defenses are available in response to a claim of libel, slander, or defamation by implication:

- Statutory protections:
 - For radio and television broadcasters.³¹
 - For good faith reports of potential child abuse, abandonment, or neglect.³²
- Privilege:
 - Absolute immunity, for any act occurring during the course of a legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial proceeding, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.³³

²² Gleisy Sopena, *Attorney-Fee Shifting is the Solution to Slapping Meritless Claims Out of Federal Courts*, 16 FIU L. REV. 833, 842 (Spring 2022).

²³ *Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1111.

²⁴ *Thomas*, 699 So. 2d at 804.

²⁵ *Wolfson v. Kirk*, 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); *Bass v. Rivera*, 826 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); *Delacruz*, 221 So. 2d at 775.

²⁶ *Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp.*, 431 So. 2d 627, 633 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (quoting *Piplack v. Mueller*, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459 (Fla. 1929)).

²⁷ *Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.*, 433 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ *Id.*; *Wolfson*, 273 So. 2d at 778.

³⁰ See *Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1111-12 (providing a list of cases that applied various privileges to defamatory statements); see also s. 770.04, F.S. (regarding liability of radio or television broadcasters); see also *Wright v. Yurko*, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding privilege extends to communications made within lawsuits).

³¹ See generally s. 770.04, F.S.

³² See generally s. 39.203, F.S.

³³ See *Kidwell v. General Motors Corp.*, 975 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (regarding judicial and quasi-judicial immunity); see also *Tucker v. Resha*, 634 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), *apprv'd*, 670 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1996) (noting,

- Absolute immunity, for state executive officers³⁴ and public officials,³⁵ as long as their statements are made in connection with their duties and responsibilities.
- Qualified immunity, when made in good faith and certain other conditions are met.³⁶
- Immunity as an expression of pure opinion, which occurs when one makes a comment or opinion based on facts in an article or are otherwise known or available to the reader or listener as a member of the public.³⁷

Actions for libel and slander must be brought within 2 years after the cause of action accrues.³⁸

Actual Malice Standard

Private individuals only need to allege and prove simple negligence to recover in defamation actions, but public figures who sue for defamation actions are subject to a different standard known as the “actual malice” standard.³⁹

As required by the landmark federal case *New York Times v. Sullivan*⁴⁰ and its progeny,⁴¹ people who qualify as public figures must show actual malice by a publisher in order to maintain an action in defamation. The existence of actual malice must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.⁴² Under the actual malice test, a public figure claimant must show that the disseminator of the information “either knew the alleged defamatory statements were false, or published them with reckless disregard despite awareness of their probable falsity.”⁴³

Because direct evidence of actual malice is rare, courts have permitted actual malice to be proved through inference and circumstantial evidence alone.⁴⁴ For example, actual malice may be found where a publisher fabricates an account, makes inherently improbable allegations, relies on a source where there is an obvious reason to doubt its veracity, or deliberately ignores evidence that calls into question published statements.⁴⁵ Although motive alone cannot suffice to prove

with emphasis added, that “[t]he public interest requires that *statements made by officials of all branches of government in connection with their official duties* be absolutely privileged”) (internal citations omitted).

³⁴ *Tucker*, 634 So. 2d at 758.

³⁵ *Hope v. National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees, Jacksonville Local No. 320*, 649 So. 2d 897, 901 fn. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

³⁶ *See Lundquist v. Alewine*, 397 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (providing that the elements essential to the finding of a conditionally privileged publication are good faith; an interest to be upheld; a statement limited in its scope to this purpose; a proper occasion; and publication in a proper manner) (internal citations omitted).

³⁷ *Sepmeier v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.*, 461 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (internal citation omitted); *Smith v. Taylor County Pub. Co., Inc.*, 443 So. 2d 1042, 1046-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

³⁸ *See* s. 95.11(4)(g), F.S. (providing a 2-year statute of limitations for libel or slander); *see also* s. 95.031(1), F.S. (providing that unless otherwise specified, the statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues).

³⁹ *Jews for Jesus, Inc.*, 997 So. 2d at 1105-06; *Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publishing, L.L.C.*, 811 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing *New York Times*).

⁴⁰ 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

⁴¹ In *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 279-84 (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court applied the actual malice standard to public officials. Three years after *New York Times*, the Court applied the same standard to public figures in *Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in plurality opinion).

⁴² *Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc.*, 408 So. 2d 666, 668-69 (Fla. 3^d DCA 1981).

⁴³ *Mile Marker, Inc.*, 811 So. 2d at 845 (citing *New York Times*).

⁴⁴ *Sindi v. El-Moslimany*, 896 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2018).

⁴⁵ *Id.*; *see also St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (remarking that publications are likely not made in good faith where “a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified

actual malice, it is a highly relevant consideration.⁴⁶ Reliance on an anonymous source for a defamatory statement constitutes actual malice only if the defendant had an obvious reason to doubt that source.⁴⁷

Whether a person qualifies as a public figure is a question of law for courts to decide.⁴⁸ State and federal common law recognize two classes of public figures: “general public figures,” who by reason of fame or notoriety in a community will in all cases be required to prove actual malice, and “limited public figures,” who are individuals who have thrust themselves forward in a particular public controversy and are therefore required to prove actual malice only in regard to certain issues.⁴⁹

Courts employ a three-part test to determine whether a claimant is a limited public figure.⁵⁰ First, the court must determine whether there is a public controversy. In determining whether a matter is a public controversy, the court determines whether a reasonable person would have expected persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution. Second, the court must determine whether the claimant played a sufficiently central role in the controversy. And third, the court must find that the alleged defamation was germane to the claimant’s involvement in the controversy.⁵¹

Courts have found individuals to be public figures for purposes of a defamation action in many factual situations, including the following:

- A person defending himself against accusations.⁵²
- A person granting an interview on a specific topic.⁵³
- A person obtaining public employment in a capacity other than as an elected officeholder or appointee of an elected officeholder.⁵⁴

anonymous telephone call[.]” or when the allegations “are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them into circulation[.]” or where there are “obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports”).

⁴⁶ *Sindi*, 896 F.3d at 16.

⁴⁷ *See Lorenz v. Donnelly*, 350 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (providing that a plaintiff must show that when the defendants published the alleged defamations they were subjectively aware that it was highly probable that the story was fabricated, so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would have put it in circulation, or based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call or some other source that appellees had obvious reasons to doubt).

⁴⁸ *Saro Corporation v. Waterman Broadcasting Corporation*, 595 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (internal citation omitted).

⁴⁹ *Id.* (internal citation omitted); *see also Mile Marker, Inc.*, 811 So. 2d at 845 (recognizing same at the state level); *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (recognizing same at the federal level).

⁵⁰ *Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Company*, 489 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (internal citations omitted).

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *See Berisha v. Lawson*, 973 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding a person a public figure because he defended himself against accusations that he was involved in an arms-dealing scandal).

⁵³ *See Mile Marker, Inc.*, 811 So. 2d at 846 (finding a person a limited public figure because, among other things, he gave an interview).

⁵⁴ *See Rosenblatt v. Baer*, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (finding that the “‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs”).

- A person who has uploaded a video, image, or statement on the Internet which has reached a broad audience.⁵⁵

Criticisms

In 1993, when U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan was still a law professor at the University of Chicago, she wrote a book review wherein she noted that extending the actual malice standard to public figures was “questionable” and the Court has “increasingly lost contact with the case’s premises and principles[.]”⁵⁶ She observed that “to the extent [*New York Times*] decreases the threat of libel litigation, it promotes not only true but also false statements of fact – statements that may themselves distort public debate[.]” and in this way “the legal standard adopted in [*New York Times*] may cut against the very values underlying the decision.”⁵⁷

In 2021, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch issued dissenting opinions in *Berisha v. Lawson* which heavily criticized the Court’s extension of the *New York Times*’ actual malice standard to public figures.

Justice Thomas advocated for reconsideration of the *New York Times* actual malice standard for two basic reasons. First, he argued that requiring public figures to establish actual malice lacks historical support and bears “no relation to the text, history, or structure of the Constitution.”⁵⁸ Second, setting aside the constitutional concerns, the doctrine has “real-world effects” that should also be considered, because “[p]ublic or private, lies impose real harm” and the actual malice standard, which is an “almost impossible” standard to meet, effectively “insulate[s] those who perpetrate lies from traditional remedies like libel suits[.]”⁵⁹

Justice Gorsuch echoed many of Justice Thomas’ criticisms but also expanded upon how changes in the media landscape since 1964, the year the Court formulated the actual malice standard in *New York Times*, have resulted in a proliferation of disinformation. After surveying those changes (e.g. the fall of traditional news outlets and professional fact-checking, the rise of cable news and social media platforms, etc.), he concluded that “[w]hat started in 1964 with a decision to tolerate the occasional falsehood to ensure robust reporting by a comparative handful of print and broadcast outlets has evolved into an ironclad subsidy for the publication of falsehoods by means on a scale previously unimaginable.”⁶⁰

⁵⁵ See *Berisha v. Lawson*, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2429 (Mem) (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (recognizing that private citizens can become public figures “on social media overnight”).

⁵⁶ Elena Kagan, “A Libel Story: *Sullivan* Then and Now (reviewing Anthony Lewis, *Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment* (1991)),” 18 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 197, 209 (1993).

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 206-07.

⁵⁸ *Berisha*, 141 S. Ct. at 2424-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing *McKee v. Cosby*, 139 S. Ct. 675 (Mem) (2019) and quoting *Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc.*, 991 F.3d 231, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting)).

⁵⁹ *Berisha*, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing several examples where defamatory statements caused real world harm).

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 2428 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch also included a significant list of former U.S. Supreme Court justices who have raised questions about various aspects of the *New York Times* case over the years.⁶¹

Journalist’s Privilege

With respect to information that a professional journalist has obtained while actively gathering news, state law provides that the professional journalist may not be compelled to either be a witness concerning that information, or disclose that information, including the identity of any source.⁶²

For purposes of the qualified privilege, a “professional journalist” means:

a person regularly engaged in collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while working as a salaried employee of, or independent contractor for, a newspaper, news journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network, or news magazine. Book authors and others who are not professional journalists, as defined in this paragraph, are not included in the provisions of this section.⁶³

“News” means information of public concern relating to local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events.⁶⁴

The statute limits the privilege to information or eyewitness observations obtained within the normal scope of employment, with the exception that it does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio recording of crimes.⁶⁵

The statute also provides that a party seeking to overcome this privilege must make a “clear and specific showing” that:

- The information is relevant and material to unresolved issues that have been raised in the proceeding for which the information is sought;
- The information cannot be obtained from alternative sources; and
- A compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the information.⁶⁶

⁶¹ *Id.* at 2429-30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing to several opinions and articles by past and present U.S. Supreme Court members).

⁶² Section 90.5015(2), F.S.

⁶³ Section 90.5015(1)(a), F.S.

⁶⁴ Section 90.5015(1)(b), F.S.

⁶⁵ Section 90.5015(2), F.S.

⁶⁶ Section 90.5015(2)(a)-(c), F.S.

Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation

A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is one ostensibly brought to redress a wrong, such as an invasion of privacy, a business tort, or an interference with a contract or an economic advantage, but actually brought to silence one or more critics.⁶⁷

Because of the variety of nominal bases for a SLAPP suit, laws to prevent them, known as anti-SLAPP laws, are phrased in terms of rights to be protected. Florida's anti-SLAPP statute⁶⁸ protects the following rights:

- The right to exercise the rights of free speech in connection with public issues.
- The right to peacefully assemble.
- The right to instruct representatives.
- The right to petition for redress of grievances before the various governmental entities of the state as protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and section 5, article I of the State Constitution.⁶⁹

Specifically, the statute prohibits a person or governmental entity from filing or causing to be filed, through its employees or agents, any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim against another person or entity, without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised any of the above-listed rights.⁷⁰

The statute also provides a right to an expeditious resolution of a claim that a suit has been filed in violation of the statute.⁷¹ The person or entity sued by a governmental entity or another person may move the court for an order dismissing the action or granting final judgment in favor of that person or entity. As soon as practicable, the court must set a hearing on the motion, which must be held at the earliest possible time after the filing of the claimant's or the governmental entity's response. If the person or entity prevails, the court may award actual damages arising from the governmental entity's violation of the statute. The court must award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a claim that an action was filed in violation of the anti-SLAPP statute.⁷²

State law also contains a similar but separate anti-SLAPP statute specific to homeowners' associations.⁷³ Among other things, it also provides for the expeditious resolution of a claim that the suit is in violation of the rights protected under the statute.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ See, e.g., The Florida Senate Committee on Judiciary, *Issue Brief 2009-332, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation* (Oct. 2008), <https://flsenate.gov/UserContent/Committees/Publications/InterimWorkProgram/2009/pdf/2009-332ju.pdf>; Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, *SLAPP suit*, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/slapp_suit (last visited Feb. 17, 2023); Public Participation Project, *What is a SLAPP?*, <https://anti-slapp.org/what-is-a-slapp> (last visited Mar. 15, 2023); The Free Dictionary, *Legal Dictionary: Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation*, <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Strategic+Lawsuits+against+Public+Participation> (last visited Mar. 15, 2023); Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, *Understanding Anti-SLAPP laws*, <https://www.rcfp.org/resources/anti-slapp-laws/> (last visited Mar. 15, 2023).

⁶⁸ Section 768.295(1), F.S.

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ Section 768.295(3), F.S.

⁷¹ Section 768.295(4), F.S.

⁷² *Id.*

⁷³ See generally s. 720.304, F.S.

⁷⁴ Section 720.304(4)(c), F.S.

III. Effect of Proposed Changes:

SB 1220 creates and amends several statutes relating to defamation causes of action. Most significantly, the bill sets the burdens of proof for a party to prevail in a defamation action, matters not addressed in the current defamation statutes. The burdens of proof in the bill appear to make the actual malice standard, set by the United States Supreme Court in *New York Times v. Sullivan*⁷⁵ and other cases, apply to fewer people and in fewer circumstances than in the Court's interpretations of the First Amendment. By setting the burdens of proof in statute, the bill may lead to appeals of decisions in defamation actions. These appeals may eventually provide the United States Supreme Court with additional opportunities to reconsider whether the First Amendment requires certain plaintiffs to prove that a defendant acted with actual malice in making a defamatory statement. For the most part, lowering the burden of proof set forth in the bill will not apply to elected officials who bring defamation actions.

Defamation

The bill creates s. 770.001, F.S., entitled "Definition," to provide that as used in chapter 770, F.S., governing defamation, an action for defamation includes actions for libel, slander, and related causes of action recognized in Florida. This provision is a codification of case law and not a change in Florida law.⁷⁶

The bill creates s. 770.045, F.S., entitled "Defamation by photograph, video, or audio recording," to provide that the publication of an altered or unaltered photograph, video, or audio recording may form the basis of a defamation action. This provision is a codification of case law and not a change in Florida law.

The bill creates s. 770.09, F.S., entitled "Public figures for purposes of defamation or related actions," to provide that a person is not a public figure for purposes of a defamation action if the person acquires fame or notoriety from one or more of the following:

- Publicly defending himself or herself against accusations.⁷⁷
- Granting an interview on a specific topic.⁷⁸
- Obtaining public employment in a capacity other than as an elected officeholder or an appointee of an elected officeholder.⁷⁹
- Uploading a video, image, or statement on the Internet which has reached a broad audience.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

⁷⁶ *Jews for Jesus*, 997 So. 2d at 1108 (finding that defamation by implication is subsumed within the tort of defamation).

⁷⁷ Compare to *Berisha*, 141 S.Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating that "[l]ower courts have even said that an individual can become a limited purpose public figure simply by defending himself from a defamatory statement"); *McKee v. Cosby*, 139 S.Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the court of appeals "concluded that, by disclosing her accusation to a reporter, McKee had 'thrust' herself to the 'forefront' of the public controversy over 'sexual assault allegations implicating Cosby' and was therefore a 'limited-purpose public figure'").

⁷⁸ Compare to *Mile Marker, Inc.*, 811 So. 2d at 846 (showing that the plaintiff became a public figure because he gave an interview among other things).

⁷⁹ Compare to *Rosenblatt*, 383 U.S. at 86 (explaining that the public official designation for purposes of the actual malice standard applies to government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs).

⁸⁰ Compare to *Berisha*, 141 S.Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating that "private citizens can become 'public figures' on social media overnight").

The provisions above are inconsistent with court opinions defining whether a person is a public figure and making the actual malice standard applicable to public figures.

The bill creates s. 770.11, F.S., entitled “Clarifying defamation standards,” to provide that a defamatory allegation is made with actual malice for purposes of a defamation action if any of the following apply:

- The defamatory allegation is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his or her imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified, anonymous report.⁸¹
- The defamatory allegation is so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would have put it into circulation.⁸²
- If the defamatory allegation was based on an informant or an informant’s report, there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or his or her report.⁸³ Obvious reasons exist to doubt the veracity of a report if:
 - There is sufficient contrary evidence that was known or should have been known to the defendant after a reasonable investigation;⁸⁴ or
 - The report is inherently improbable or implausible on its face.⁸⁵

The provisions above codify case law describing acts constituting actual malice.

The bill creates s. 770.12, F.S., entitled “Unidentified source for a defamatory statement; negligence standards applicable,” to provide that if the actual malice standard otherwise applies to a defamation action in which the defendant does not identify the source for a defamatory statement, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant acted negligently in making the defamatory statement.

This provision may require a person who does not disclose the identity of the person who provided the information for the defamatory statement to be subject to the lower negligence standard in a defamation action. With respect to public figures, the provision conflicts with case law that would subject a public figure to the higher actual malice standard.

The bill creates s. 770.13, F.S., entitled “Defamatory statements unrelated to public figure status; negligence standard applicable,” to provide that in a defamation action based on an alleged defamatory statement that does not relate to the reasons for the plaintiff’s status as a public figure, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant acted negligently in making or repeating the defamatory statement.

Current case law does not appear to create exceptions from the actual malice standard for persons who are deemed public figures.

⁸¹ *St. Amant*, 390 U.S. at 732 (explaining that actual malice likely exists if “a publisher’s allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation”).

⁸² *Id.*

⁸³ *Id.*

⁸⁴ *McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc.*, 91 F.3d 1501, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that “actual malice may be inferred from an author’s or publisher’s inability to corroborate a story only when, in attempting to corroborate, he encounters persuasive evidence that contradicts the allegation”).

⁸⁵ *St. Amant*, 390 U.S. at 732 (explaining that recklessness for purposes of the actual malice standard “may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports”).

The bill amends the statute governing venue for defamation actions⁸⁶ to provide that venue for a cause of action for defamation is proper in any county identified in the general venue statute,⁸⁷ including any county where the defamatory material is accessed by a third party. This provision codifies case law interpreting the venue statutes.⁸⁸

Journalist’s Privilege

The bill amends the statute codifying the journalist’s privilege,⁸⁹ to provide that it does not apply to defamation or related actions against a professional journalist.

The journalist’s privilege “has the effect of making proof of actual malice impossible because establishing what the publisher knew or did not know at the time of the publication depends on the kind and quality of the information and identity of the sources at hand when the publication was made.”⁹⁰

Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation

The bill amends two anti-SLAPP statutes⁹¹ to provide that a defendant in an action for defamation or similar action who files a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment under those statutes is entitled to attorney fees and costs only if the allegedly defamatory statement was not negligently made. The bill also provides that nothing in those statutes shift a party’s burden of proof.⁹²

Existing law allows a person who negligently makes a defamatory statement to use the anti-SLAPP statutes to recover attorney fees and costs from the defamed individual if the defamed individual is unable to prove that the defamatory statements were made with actual malice.

Effective Date

The bill takes effect July 1, 2023.

IV. Constitutional Issues:

A. Municipality/County Mandates Restrictions:

None.

⁸⁶ Section 770.05, F.S.

⁸⁷ Section 47.011, F.S.

⁸⁸ See *Lowery v. McBee*, 322 So. 3d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

⁸⁹ Section 90.5015, F.S.

⁹⁰ *News-Journal Corp. v. Carson*, 741 So. 2d 572, 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (recognizing further that “some state shield laws are made inapplicable in defamation suits where bad faith or malice are alleged or where the media defendant raises a confidential source as a defense” and citing Carl C. Monk, *Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists’ Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection*, 51 MO. L.REV. 1, 8 (1986), in support).

⁹¹ Sections 768.295 and 720.304, F.S.

⁹² The provision that the anti-SLAPP statute does not shift the burden to plaintiffs to establish that their claims have merit is consistent with *Lam v. Univision Communications, Inc.*, 329 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), but inconsistent with *Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc.*, 264 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

B. Public Records/Open Meetings Issues:

None.

C. Trust Funds Restrictions:

None.

D. State Tax or Fee Increases:

None.

E. Other Constitutional Issues:

The following provisions in the bill potentially conflict with *New York Times* and its progeny, which construe defamation standards in light of First Amendment protections:

- A person is not a public figure for purposes of a defamation action if the person acquires fame or notoriety from one or more of the following:
 - Publicly defending himself or herself against accusations.
 - Granting an interview on a specific topic.
 - Obtaining public employment in a capacity other than as an elected officeholder or an appointee of an elected officeholder.
 - Uploading a video, image, or statement on the Internet which has reached a broad audience.
- If the actual malice standard otherwise applies to a defamation action in which the defendant does not identify the source for a defamatory statement, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant acted negligently in making the defamatory statement.
- ‘In a defamation action based on an alleged defamatory statement that does not relate to the reasons for the plaintiff’s status as a public figure, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant acted negligently in making or repeating the statement.

V. Fiscal Impact Statement:**A. Tax/Fee Issues:**

None.

B. Private Sector Impact:

Because the bill may ultimately make it easier for private plaintiffs to sue for defamation, it is anticipated that defendants in such cases may have to pay more in awards (to satisfy meritorious defamation claims), claim settlements, and additional legal fees and costs. On the other hand, persons held to higher standards to avoid making defamatory statements may incur additional costs for conducting investigations before making potentially defamatory statements.

C. Government Sector Impact:

Because the bill may ultimately make it easier for private plaintiffs to sue for defamation, it is anticipated that such suits will increase court caseloads to some degree, and the costs associated with maintaining same.

VI. Technical Deficiencies:

None.

VII. Related Issues:

None.

VIII. Statutes Affected:

This bill substantially amends the following sections of the Florida Statutes: 90.5015, 770.05, 768.295, and 720.304.

This bill creates the following sections of the Florida Statutes: 770.001, 770.045, 770.09, 770.11, 770.12, and 770.13.

IX. Additional Information:**A. Committee Substitute – Statement of Changes:**

(Summarizing differences between the Committee Substitute and the prior version of the bill.)

None.

B. Amendments:

None.